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INTRODUCTION
Cars, airplanes, compact disc players, cellular telephones, heart
1
monitors, weapons systems, and personal computers all have it. In
“the race to the bottom,” an ever increasing number of U.S.
businesses turn to the People’s Republic of China (“China”) to
2
3
develop it.
But, the United States Government, and some
1. Edward A. Lee, Embedded Software, Nov. 1, 2001, http://ptolemy.eecs.berkeley.
edu/publications/papers/02/embsoft/embsoftwre.pdf, published in 56 ADVANCES IN
COMPUTERS 56 (2002) [hereinafter Lee, Embedded Software]; accord Bas Graaf et al.,
Embedded Software Engineering: The State of the Practice, IEEE SOFTWARE, Nov.-Dec. 2003,
at 61 (reiterating that cars and airplanes as well as DVD players and medical systems
use embedded software); Edward A. Lee, What’s Ahead for Embedded Software?,
COMPUTER, Sept. 2000, at 18 [hereinafter Lee, What’s Ahead] (repeating that “gadgets
and cars use embedded software”).
2. See Stephen F. Diamond, The “Race To The Bottom” Returns: China’s Challenge
To The International Labor Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39, 41-42 (2003)
(describing the “race to the bottom” not solely in terms of a company’s ability to
employ the lowest wages but also its ability to combine high-productivity with lower
wages than would be demanded in more developed countries); see also Paul
McDougall, The Offshore Equation, INFO. WEEK, Sept. 6, 2004, at 32, available at
http://www.informationweek.com (search “The Offshore Equation”) (providing an
example of a moving and relocation company who required a Return on Investment
within two years; to meet this ROI and provide a technical solution to better match
customer demand with available trucks, the company had to use a software
development company based in India, at a fraction of the cost).
3. See Mickey Meece, Lenovo Aims to Calm Fears Over Security, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2006, at C3 (reporting on the State Department’s fears of viruses in computers
purchased from Lenovo, a China-based computer manufacturer); Gary Anthes, DOD
Report to Detail Dangers of Foreign Software, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 22, 2006,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&arti
cleId=274599&intsrc=hm_list (announcing that one day, the United States will “badly
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4

independent researchers are concerned about the vulnerability of it.
“It” is embedded software—the instructions that programmers
encode within a device, such as a CD player or weapon system, that
5
help the device function.
Embedded software pervades civilian and military products due to
6
the increasing sophistication and use of technology. U.S. companies
that develop this embedded software compete in a global market
7
where labor and resource costs outside the United States are lower.
Therefore, these companies choose to develop, or “source,”

need communications” and will have a denial of service attack resulting in a “billiondollar weapon[] unable to function”); see also John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, U.S.
Clears Merger of IBM’s PC Division with Giant Chinese Computer Maker, 11 INT’L L. UPDATE
47, 47 (2005) (reporting that to complete the sale Lenovo agreed to move its
headquarters from Beijing to the United States to satisfy the U.S. government).
4. See John Markoff, Study Says Chips in ID Tags Are Vulnerable to Viruses, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at C3 (quoting the opinion of Peter Neumann, a computer
scientist at a research firm in California, who said “[i]t shouldn’t surprise you that a
system that is designed to be manufactured as cheaply as possible is designed with no
security constraints whatsoever”); Erik Sherman, Going East, INFO. SECURITY, Nov.
2003, at 14, available at http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/ss/0,295796,sid6_iss2
05_art458,00.html (emphasizing that the inclusion of malicious code is a risk when
using third parties to code a company’s software); see also Richard Ford, Malcode
Mysteries Revealed, SECURITY & PRIVACY (IEEE, New York, NY), May-June 2005, at 72
(reporting that viruses and worms still exist and should be defended against even
though some computer users see them as requirements to the benefits of
technology).
5. See, e.g., Lee, Embedded Software, supra note 1, at 1 (stressing that embedded
software’s principal role is its “interaction with the physical world” and its execution
on various machines that are not necessarily personal computers).
6. E.g., Graaf, supra note 1, at 61 (predicting that by 2013 the use of products
containing embedded software will grow “exponentially”). Contrary to what its name
might imply, embedded software is not simply typical software, such as Microsoft
Word, on a microchip. Lee, Embedded Software, supra note 1, at 2. Embedded
software is more closely related to the device or hardware into which it is
programmed, such as a telephone or personal digital assistant (“PDA”), than
Microsoft Word is related to a computer. Id. Microsoft Word can be used on many
devices, including different brands of computers or PDAs, but embedded software
programmed for a cellular telephone is suitable only for the telephone. As such, the
hardware constrains the ability to program, test, and secure the embedded software.
Graaf, supra note 1, at 61. Often an engineer who is an expert in the hardware
designs the embedded software program, rather than a typical software programmer
who can design and build a program for use on many different types of operating
systems. Lee, What’s Ahead, supra note 1, at 19. Therefore, this Comment chooses to
focus on embedded software because of its increasing use, its requirement for
specialization, and its challenge to thorough testing.
7. See, e.g., Carlos Grande, Companies UK: Marconi’s Technology Fails the Price Test,
FIN. TIMES (London), May 4, 2005, at 23 (reporting that Marconi lost a British
Telecom contract based on price, not knowledge, which might lead to a reduction in
Marconi’s R&D workforce to reduce its own costs); Paul McDougall, supra note 2, at
32 (providing an example of a moving and relocation company that used a software
development company based in India, at a fraction of the cost of software
development companies in the United States, in order to meet a two-year Return on
Investment).
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embedded software offshore to decrease costs and increase profits
quickly.
The term “offshore sourcing” refers to the situation where a
company uses low cost, high quality labor in a “host” country to
perform tasks or processes that are not part of the company’s core
8
business. With over 5,000 students and professionals completing
studies in the United States, then returning to China, more U.S.
companies are choosing China as a host country because the high
quality of the workforce in addition to its lower cost equals a high
9
return on investment. Increasingly, however, this selection is causing
8. ERRAN CARMEL & PAUL TJIA, OFFSHORING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
SOURCING AND OUTSOURCING TO A GLOBAL WORKFORCE xix (2005) (using the term
“offshore sourcing” to encompass the situation “[w]here sourcing can be from
outside the firm or inside the firm[,]” but the location is outside the boundaries of
the home country). In other words, the U.S. company has sourced a portion of work
to a different country. Id. Offshore sourcing may also include joint ventures with a
partner company that is local to the foreign country. Id. at 120 (reviewing the
principle deal structures of an offshore sourcing arrangement, including the captive
center/subsidiary, joint venture, build operate transfer model, and contract). See
generally Trevor W. Nagel & Michael T. Murphy, Structuring Technology Outsourcing
Relationships: Customer Concerns, Strategies and Processes, 4 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 151,
163 (1996) (noting that a proposal for outsourcing work can be a strategic alliance
or partnership). Strictly speaking, “offshoring” signifies using a non-home country
for a business transaction. CARMEL & TJIA, supra, at xviii; see Fraser Mendel, Offshore
Outsourcing and Offshoring to China, in JOHN F. DELANEY & WILLIAM A. TANENBAUM,
PRACTISING LAW INST., THE OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2005: PROTECTING CRITICAL
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 257 (2005) (defining “offshore outsourcing” as hiring a thirdparty to complete work for the customer’s business “in a country other than the one
that is the major market for the final product or service”). Correspondingly,
businesses use “outsourcing” to signify “that tasks and processes are contracted to be
performed outside the boundaries of the firm.” CARMEL & TJIA, supra, at xviii-xix
(elaborating with the example that General Electric uses Tata Consultancy Services
in India to perform certain tasks, while Siemens has a center it owns in India).
Additionally, businesses use the term to signify when they delegate an entire process,
and sometimes physical assets or staff, to an outsider. Id. at xviii-xix (providing the
example that these processes can be a single task for a one time project or an ongoing business process such as a call center). See generally E. Michael Power & Roland
L. Trope, Averting Security Missteps in Outsourcing, http://www.computer.org/secu
rity (describing how companies increasingly use providers in other countries to
perform tasks on a continuing basis). This Comment uses the terms “offshore
sourcing” and “sourcing” to mean performing some business task in a non-U.S.
country.
9. CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at 31 (comparing the average annual wage for a
software professional in the United States of $63,000 with $9,000 at the highest range
for India and $14,200 at the highest range for China). Furthermore, the Chinese
Communist Party declared in their Tenth Five-Year Plan in 2001 that developing
skills in technology is a key goal for the country. Tenth Five-Year Plan for National
Economic and Social Development (promulgated by State Council of China, Mar.
15, 2001, effective Mar. 15, 2001), translated at http://www.trp.hku.hk/infofile/china
/2002/10-5-yr-plan.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Tenth FiveYear Plan P.R.C.] (listing “Making Reform and Opening Up and Making
Technological Progress the Driving Force” as one of the Guiding Principles of the
Five-Year Plan). As stated in its 1982 Constitution and in its Tenth Five-Year Plan,
China is committed to opening the country to investment and in particular wants to
develop its technology sector. XIAN FA preamble (1982) (P.R.C.); Tenth Five-Year
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concerns about the security of the resulting embedded software
10
product.
In 2005, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) commissioned a
Defense Science Board Task Force to study “the extent to which
foreign influenced software is embedded within systems critical to
11
[its] mission . . . .”
Although the government commissioned the
study, any industry using embedded software feels this foreign
influence due to the complexity and globalization of computer
12
software.
For example, a group of independent researchers
demonstrated that a programmer could insert a software virus into a
radio frequency identification tag (“RFID”), which is part of a
microchip-based tracking technology used in commercial
13
applications.

Plan P.R.C., supra. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFSHORING: U.S.
SEMICONDUCTOR AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES INCREASINGLY PRODUCE IN CHINA AND INDIA
2, 8-12 (2006) (tracking the flow of manufacturing of semiconductor devices and
software development to India and China from the early 1990s and summarizing that
the cost savings and high quality work companies experienced overseas led
companies to expand offshore sourcing to software and systems integration).
10. See Power & Trope, supra note 8, at 70-73 (discussing the security risks posed
by outsourcing technology development to outsiders).
11. See Memorandum from Kenneth J. Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense, to
Chairman, Defense Science Board (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/tors/
TOR-2005-10-05-MIFIDS.pdf; see also DEFENSE SCIENCE TASK FORCE, HIGH
PERFORMANCE MICROCHIP SUPPLY 3 (2005), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/r
eports/2005-02-HPMS%5FReport%5FFinal.pdf (summarizing that the study revealed
that the manufacturing capabilities of critical microelectronics have moved to
countries with lower cost capital, which results in lower trustworthiness and supply
assurance for such components); Anthes, supra note 3 (discussing the upcoming
release of the DOD report that “calls for a variety of prevention and detection
measures”). According to the Anthes article, the DOD task force was supposed to declassify the full software report in early 2007. Id. As of July 1, 2007, the report is not
posted. When de-classified, the report will be available at the Defense Science Board
website, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm.
12. Anthes, supra note 3 (clarifying that it is not xenophobia but the fact that
everything is connected that makes networks vulnerable to code that is developed
overseas with little or no U.S. oversight); accord Sherman, supra note 4, at 14
(discussing concerns from companies and academic researchers regarding the
vulnerability of software developed overseas).
13. Markoff, supra note 4. In addition, experts in the computer engineering field
report that ensuring fully secure embedded software—meaning little to no software
errors—is, at best, difficult. E.g., PAUL KOCHER ET AL., SECURITY AS A NEW DIMENSION
IN EMBEDDED SYSTEM DESIGN 753 (2004) (asserting that although security for
embedded software systems is critical, these same systems are constrained by their
own designs from providing full security); Louise Longdin, Liability for Defects in
Bespoke Software: Are Lawyers and Information Scientists Speaking the Same Language?, 8
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 11 (2000) (reporting that often software is released with
known defects).
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The cost of failed software can be in the billions of dollars. Even
more devastating, it can result in the loss of life. A Patriot Missile
failed to intercept an Iraqi Scud missile during the 1991 Gulf War,
killing twenty-eight American soldiers, because the missile’s software
15
contained incorrect calculations.
While that was an inadvertent
miscalculation, programmers can insert malicious miscalculations
16
into any embedded software developed overseas.
This malicious
code can be a virus, worm, or any other series of computations that
17
would cause a harmful effect to the product or the product’s user.
Although companies test embedded software before releasing the
product to the buyer, the amount of testing varies and at best only
guarantees that the product has less than a certain number of defects,
18
not zero defects. As a result, companies could unknowingly release
products containing a malicious code. Different political regimes
19
and possible animosity towards the United States increase this risk.
This Comment argues that the United States has the legal means to
address the challenges presented by sourcing embedded software
14. E.g., James Gleick, Little Bug, Big Bang, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, § 6
(Magazine), at 38 (reporting on the crash of the Ariane-5 unmanned rocket that cost
$7 billion to build and explaining that an incorrect conversion of a 64-bit number to
a 16-bit number caused the system to shut down and the rocket to explode on its first
launch).
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PATRIOT MISSILE DEFENSE: SOFTWARE PROBLEM
LED TO SYSTEM FAILURE AT DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA 1 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Anthes, supra note 3 (quoting Ira Winkler, author of the book Spies
Among Us, as suggesting that “[i]f there is one line of code written overseas, that’s
one line too many”).
17. See Ford, supra note 4, at 72 (defining viruses and worms). People often use
the terms virus and worm interchangeably. However, they are technically different.
A virus is a self-replicating program that copies itself and can modify other programs,
such that using the modified program implies using an evolved version of the
original virus. Id. at 72. On the other hand, a worm is a self-contained program that
does not need other programs in order to copy itself to other computer systems.
EUGENE H. SPAFFORD, A FAILURE TO LEARN FROM THE PAST 2 (2003). Regardless, both
a virus and a worm can be classified as malicious code. Id. See generally Symantec
Corp., What Is The Difference Between Viruses, Worms, and Trojans?,
http://service1.symantec.com/SUPPORT/nav.nsf/docid/ 1999041209131106 (last
visited Aug. 19, 2007) (providing more definitions of various malicious programs).
18. See, e.g., Longdin, supra note 13, at 10-11 (relating the various methods of
testing, including user acceptance testing, that most software goes through). Some
software manufacturers may use “cleanroom” engineering to certify reliability. Id. at
10.
“Cleanroom” engineering means that throughout the entire program
development process the quality of the product is continually assessed and, if
necessary, adjusted. Id. While this results in fewer errors, it is also time intensive,
resulting in higher development costs. Id. at 10-11.
19. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
CHALLENGES AND EFFORTS TO SECURE CONTROL SYSTEMS 14 (2004) (concluding that
the security of the control system that governs U.S. infrastructure is vulnerable to
cyber–attacks); Robert Lezner & Nathan Vardi, The Next Threat, FORBES, Sept. 20,
2004, at 70 (reporting that the FBI and NSA believe foreign governments such as
Iran and China have trained hackers in Internet warfare).
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development in China. This Comment uses an “embedded software
scenario” as its example for analysis of the risks involved in
developing embedded software in China and the possible legal means
20
to reduce that risk or prosecute the offenders.
In the embedded software scenario, a U.S. company uses China as
a host country and Chinese employees to develop embedded software
for any number of devices. Thus, in the scenario, it is a Chinese
programmer who inserts malicious code into the embedded
21
software. The U.S. company then exports the embedded software
from China to the United States, where the malicious code executes
and damages the end-user. Part I explains the two business
arrangements the U.S. company likely uses when offshore sourcing to
China. Part I will also briefly analyze the U.S. company’s ability to
choose the law and forum that will govern in the event of a breach of
contract. This understanding is important because while Part II
explains that Chinese and U.S. regulatory laws are not sufficient
protection for the risks of the embedded software scenario, Part III
suggests that parties to the contract should choose U.S. law where
they have the freedom to do so or, alternatively, incorporate the
22
language of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) into
23
private contracts as additional protection. Finally, Part III argues
24
that United States v. Ivanov
properly applied the CFAA
extraterritorially and uses a comparison to extraterritorial application
20. Since the Internet, viruses have become mainstream. Correspondingly, many
law review articles have been written on the question of jurisdiction. The majority of
these articles focus on jurisdiction over the Internet for any country or jurisdiction
over crimes that take place over the Internet; they do not generally discuss the
extraterritorial application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). See, e.g.,
Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction, 4 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 1, 3-10 (2004); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV.
1, 2-5 (1996); Ellen S. Podgor, Cybercrime: National, Transnational, or International?, 50
WAYNE L. REV. 97, 97-101 (2004). One Note does apply the principles of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the 1994 version of the CFAA, but again does so
generally to viruses released over the Internet. John Eisinger, Note, Script Kiddies
Beware: The Long Arm of U.S. Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1507,
1508, 1512-37 (2002). This Comment, in contrast, focuses on two jurisdictions, the
United States and China. This Comment also does not address viruses released over
the Internet. Instead, it focuses on a virus within a physical good such as a computer,
car, or airplane and analyzes extraterritorial jurisdiction of the current CFAA in light
of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust and securities laws.
21. Although any programmer, Chinese or American, could insert malicious
code into embedded software, this Comment chooses to focus on the situation where
a Chinese programmer does so in order to limit the paper to the territorial
jurisdiction issues.
22. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, tit. II,
ch. XXI, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-92 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)).
23. See infra Part III (discussing the advantages to incorporating U.S. law into
foreign contracts).
24. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2001).
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of economic laws to support this argument. The article concludes
that a U.S. court should find subject matter jurisdiction under the
CFAA in the embedded software scenario, providing the United
States with a method to deter and punish those who jeopardize the
security of technological products.
I.

OVERVIEW OF BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS AND CHOICE OF LAW
WHEN OFFSHORE SOURCING TO CHINA

Sourcing business in China is a relatively new experience for most
25
U.S. companies. A U.S. company sourcing in China can choose
26
Two of the most
from several types of business arrangements.
popular are joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises
27
(“WFOEs”).
Each business arrangement has different results
regarding control of the business and choice of law and forum.
A. Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Are Most Popular
A U.S. company interested in offshore sourcing to China can
choose to be a foreign-invested enterprise with a Chinese partner
28
through a joint venture. In this arrangement, there is a contract
25. See JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGNINVESTED ENTERPRISE 81 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that 1980s regulations limited the
types of direct investments businesses could undertake in China, but today China has
relaxed some standards to make a wholly foreign-owned enterprise more common);
US-China Business Council, An Introduction to the US-China Business Council,
http://www.uschina.org/ more.html (last visited July 23, 2007) (explaining that
since the end of the 1970s, there has been “massive growth of U.S.-China economic
engagement”). Even though international business transactions can be traced back
to 1622, establishing a business in China has only recently become common. JOHN
H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 46-48 (3d
ed. 1995) (diagramming a “typical international sales transaction” and noting that
international law may affect a bank’s ability to issue letters of credit and that “conflict
of laws” arise during contractual disputes of this nature); Lee Peoples, Strategies and
Sources for International Legal Research, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 412, 421 (2006)
(noting that international trade law can be traced back to 1622 and the customary
law of merchants).
26. See CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at xix (reviewing offshore arrangements such
as the subsidiary arrangement, joint venture, build operate transfer model, and onetime contracts for specific tasks); Nagel & Murphy, supra note 8, at 163 (noting that a
proposal for outsourcing work can be a strategic alliance or partnership).
27. Jie Chen, Guide to Establishing a Subsidiary in China, THE LICENSING JOURNAL,
Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 8.
28. CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at 119; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 90, 103.
For purposes of this Comment, the foreign partner has no possibility of acquiring a
controlling interest in the joint venture or U.S. company. If the Chinese partner
could acquire a controlling interest, the arrangement would be subject to review
under the Exon-Florio Amendment. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (1994); 31 C.F.R.
800.301; David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign
Investment in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 926, 96566 (1990); see Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International
Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 82-83
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between the U.S. company and the Chinese counterpart to form the
29
In addition, there are separate contracts for any
joint venture.
transactions or agreements between the resulting joint venture
30
enterprise and the U.S. company. Similarly, there are contracts for
transactions between the joint venture enterprise and the Chinese
31
While a joint venture gives some control of the
counterpart.
business to the China-based partner, having a Chinese counterpart,
who is more familiar with Chinese law, can be a significant benefit to
32
the U.S. company.
Alternatively, a U.S. company can choose to be a foreign-invested
enterprise without a China-based partner by creating its own center
33
to develop the embedded software. The U.S. company can consider
this a branch of the U.S. office or a subsidiary of the parent
34
company. Under Chinese law this arrangement will usually create a
(1989); infra Part II.B (discussing the Exon-Florio Amendment). Joint ventures in
China must be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment (promulgated by State Council, Sept. 20, 1983, effective Sept. 20,
1983), art. 8, translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/lawsdata/ch
ineselaw.html/1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Regulations for
Implementation of Joint Ventures P.R.C.].
29. See Regulations for Implementation of Joint Ventures P.R.C., supra note 28, at
art. 9(1) (discussing the process of approval for a joint venture with a foreign entity).
30. See id. art. 7 (listing the various agreements and contracts that the joint
ventures have the right to operate under).
31. Id.
32. The Chinese partner may be more connected in the government and judicial
system, which can facilitate approvals and prompt treatment in the courts.
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 89 (pointing out that a Chinese partner can assist in
developing an operational base, securing resources, and using “guanxi” or
“connections” to help with government approval); accord Patricia Pattison & Daniel
Herron, The Mountains Are High and the Emperor Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in
China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 484-85 (stating that “guanxi” is a method of cultivating
relationships and has often benefited Chinese citizens when the rule of law has been
lacking). But see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 92 (asserting that WFOEs are more
popular now and giving tips on how to select a Chinese partner if law or necessity
does not allow the U.S. company to set up a WFOE).
33. CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at 119. In China, the detailed regulations vary
depending on the type of organization and parties involved. For example, China has
a specific law for joint ventures and a different law for WFOEs. E.g., Regulations for
Implementation of Joint Ventures P.R.C., supra note 28; Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises in China (repromulgated by Order No. 301 of the State Council, April 12, 2001, effective April
12, 2001) (P.R.C.), translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/lawsda
ta/chine selaw.html/3 (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Rules for
Implementation of WFOEs P.R.C.]. Because state law generally governs businesses in
the United States, the state in which the business operates or is incorporated would
govern the type of offshore sourcing arrangement in the United States. See generally
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 260-61 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
34. See CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at xix, 119; see also Chen, supra note 27, at 7
(guiding readers on the value of establishing a subsidiary in China if the company
intends to conduct long-term business in China). In either the captive center or
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35

WFOE. U.S. companies typically choose to establish a WFOE to
have maximum control in hiring employees and dictating company
36
policy, while enjoying limited liability. Unlike a joint venture, there
is no contract between the U.S. company and a Chinese counterpart
37
in this arrangement.
Although the prospect of having a formal
Chinese business partner affects the arrangement the U.S. company
chooses, the ability to choose the law and the forum governing the
contracts also affects the decision of the U.S. company to source
38
development in China.
B. Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Depend on the Offshore Sourcing
Arrangement
Just as U.S. parties to a contract can often choose which law and
forum will govern any contractual disputes, China’s Contract Law
subsidiary arrangement, the company could have started the business in China or
acquired an already established company. CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at 119. To
analyze U.S. regulatory law in Part II.B, this Comment assumes that the foreign-based
subsidiary or branch has no possibility of acquiring a controlling interest in the U.S.
parent company.
35. Rules for Implementation of WFOEs P.R.C., supra note 33; ZIMMERMAN, supra
note 25, at 76-80, 113; cf. Company Law (promulgated by Standing Committee of
National People’s Congress, Dec. 29, 1993, revised Dec. 25, 1999), ch. 9 (P.R.C.),
translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/lawsdata/chineselaw.html
/1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (allowing foreign companies to set up branches in
China; however, different laws govern WFOEs or joint ventures). The arrangement
could also be a representative office but this is less likely because a representative
office may not engage in profit making activities, including signing contracts. See
Chen, supra note 27, at 7 (commenting that while a representative office can act as a
liaison for a foreign-based company, it cannot conduct business in China directly).
Each of these are distinct types of “foreign invested enterprises” without a Chinese
partner that are available to any foreign party. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 75.
China also recognizes other business arrangements such as processing trade
contracts, holding companies, and foreign-invested venture capital investment
enterprises. Id. at 106-25. However, these types of organizations are not applicable
to an offshore sourcing arrangement and as such will not be discussed in this
Comment.
36. See Chen, supra note 27, at 7 (asserting that choosing a WFOE model for
investment in China is becoming more popular as foreign companies become
comfortable with doing business in China, and China becomes comfortable with
allowing foreign businesses in); see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 79 (noting that
after China’s accession to the WTO, U.S. companies have greater flexibility and meet
less resistance when setting up WFOEs, leading to the WFOE being the preferred
entity of foreign investors).
37. Although there would be contractual obligations between the U.S. subsidiary
and its parent, no contract would exist between a U.S. company and a Chineseowned enterprise because the whole endeavor would be under the complete control
of the U.S. company. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 78-81 (discussing the WFOE
as being free from outside investment—hence, the “wholly foreign-owned enterprise”
label).
38. For each of the arrangements discussed in this section, except for the WFOE
arrangement, there will be a contract between the U.S. company and the Chinese
counterpart which details the responsibilities of each. See infra Part I.B (discussing
the substantive contract law of China).
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allows the parties to a “foreign-related” contract to choose Chinese
39
law or foreign law as the basis for resolving disputes. A foreignrelated contract, in the offshore sourcing situation, means that one
40
party is not a Chinese legal person.
China considers the joint venture enterprise that results from the
partnership between the U.S. company and the Chinese company a
41
Chinese legal person.
While the contract between the U.S. and
Chinese companies establishing a joint venture meets the definition
of a foreign-related contract, implying choice of law, the Contract
Law stipulates that the contracts for Chinese-foreign joint ventures
42
shall apply the laws of China. Thus, the contract between the U.S.
company and the Chinese counterpart that forms the joint venture
43
must choose Chinese law. The parties may still choose arbitration as

39. Contract Law (promulgated by National People’s Congress Mar. 15, 1999,
effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 126, translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/co
lumn/lawsdata/chineselaw.html/1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Contract Law P.R.C.]. The first clause of Article 126 as translated states:
Parties to a foreign related contract may choose a country’s law as an
applicable law for contract dispute resolution unless there is a different
provision in any Chinese laws. If parties to a foreign contract fail to choose
an applicable law, the laws of the country which has the closest relation to
the contract shall be applicable.
WEI LUO, THE CONTRACT LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 61 (1999)
[hereinafter WEI LUO, CONTRACT LAW P.R.C.]; see Mo Zhang, Choice of Law in
Contracts: A Chinese Approach, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 289, 314-15 (2006) (explaining
that the first clause of Article 126 of the Contract Law permits the parties expressly to
choose the applicable law for the contract so long as the exception clause is not
triggered). The Chinese Contract Law became effective in 1999 and reflects a
reform in China to incorporate internationally recognized contract principles such
as equality between parties, good faith, and freedom of contract. WEI LUO,
CONTRACT LAW P.R.C., supra, at 12-13. This reform is a step towards China becoming
a more market based economy. Id. at 13-14.
40. Mo Zhang, supra note 39, at 298 (listing the possible permutations of a
foreign contract as “(a) at least one party is not a Chinese citizen or legal person, (b)
the subject matter of the contract is in a foreign country (e.g., the item to be sold or
purchased is located outside of China), or (c) the conclusion or performance of the
contract is made in a foreign country”). Only when a contract is “foreign” under
Chinese law does “the question as to which law shall govern the contract become
relevant.” Id. “If a contract is domestic in nature, it is without question that the
contract will be subject to Chinese law only.” Id.
41. Regulations for the Implementation of Joint Ventures P.R.C., supra note 28,
at art. 2. In normal commercial contracts with third parties and joint ventures, the
Contract Law P.R.C. would apply. See Contract Law P.R.C., supra note 39, at art. 126;
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 25, at 90 nn.46-47. In the United States, joint ventures are
part of the state law for corporations. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX &
HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 1.08 (2d ed. 2003). The foreign counterpart of the joint
venture is usually considered to be doing business in the state as a partnership and is
governed by state law, instead of Chinese law. FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA Corporations
§ 8500 (1998). However, this Comment does not undertake an analysis of the
liability of partnerships in the United States.
42. Contract Law P.R.C., supra note 39, at art. 126.
43. Id. The second clause of Article 126 states:
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the forum for dispute resolution under the Contract Law. Because
the joint venture is a Chinese legal person, the contract and
transactions between the China-based provider and the joint venture
45
is a domestic contract and automatically governed by Chinese law.
Similarly, China considers the WFOE a self-contained Chinese legal
46
For the majority of the transactions the
person upon creation.
47
WFOE conducts, the U.S. company does not have a choice of law or
The laws of the People’s Republic of China shall be applied to all Sinoforeign equity joint venture enterprise contracts, Sino-foreign cooperative
joint venture enterprise contracts and exploration and development of
natural resources contracts which are performed within the territory of the
People’s Republic of China.
WEI LUO, CONTRACT LAW P.R.C., supra note 39, at 61; see Mo Zhang, supra note 39, at
320 (explaining that although Chinese Contract Law recognizes party autonomy in
choosing the law to be applied, the second paragraph of Article 126 has a mandatory
exception for Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures, which must choose Chinese
law).
44. Contract Law P.R.C., supra note 39, at art. 128. Article 128 states in relevant
part:
The parties may resolve a contract dispute[] through settlement or
mediation. . . . The parties to a foreign contract may submit their disputes to
a Chinese arbitration institution or other arbitration institutions for
arbitration according to their arbitration agreement.
WEI LUO, CONTRACT LAW P.R.C., supra note 39, at 62.
45. Contract Law P.R.C., supra note 39, at art. 126; see Mo Zhang, supra note 39,
at 298 (“If a contract is domestic in nature, it is without question that the contract
will be subject to Chinese law only.”).
46. Rules for Implementation of WFOEs P.R.C., supra note 33, at art. 2 (“Wholly
foreign-owned enterprises shall be subject to the jurisdiction of and receive the
protection of Chinese laws.
Business activities which wholly foreign-owned
enterprises engage in within Chinese territory must comply with Chinese laws and
regulations and any activity detrimental to China’s social public interest shall be
prohibited.”). Being subject to Chinese law may concern U.S. companies because of
the relative lack of transparency and influence of the Chinese Communist Party on
the judicial system. Sarah Biddulph, China’s Accession to the WTO: Legal System
Transparency and Administrative Reform, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL
TRADE: THE ACCESSION OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 156 (Sylvia
Ostry et al. eds., 2002); Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from
Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 97, 97-100 (2005). At the same time, a WFOE would
theoretically receive the same protection under Chinese law as any other Chinese
business because of China’s WTO membership. See World Trade Organization,
Principles of the Trading System, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ti
f_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (describing the principle of national
treatment). Interestingly, the United States would consider the Chinese subsidiary of
a U.S. company subject to U.S. law for certain purposes. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 414 (1987) (“[A] state may exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe for limited purposes with respect to activities of foreign
branches of corporations organized under its laws.”); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign
Corporations § 448 (explaining that by virtue of the minimum contacts doctrine, a
subsidiary may be subject to in personam jurisdiction in the state in which its parent
is located).
47. Some interactions between the WFOE as a subsidiary to a U.S. company may
be governed by U.S. law. “[A] state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe for limited
purposes with respect to activities of foreign branches of corporations organized
under its laws.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 414;
36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 448.
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choice of forum as between Chinese law and U.S. law with this
48
Chinese law will govern most business the WFOE
arrangement.
conducts in China. However, in China, every company must provide
49
an employment contract with its employees.
If the U.S. parent
company, not the WFOE, is employing the Chinese programmer, the
employment contract is a foreign-related contract and the U.S.
company may choose the law and the forum to be applied to that
50
contract.
While the Chinese Contract Law provides some flexibility for U.S.
companies sourcing in China, choice of law and choice of forum are
voluntary between the parties and relies on the parties including
sufficiently clear terms. If protective terms are not included or are
not clear, the contracts will not sufficiently protect the U.S. company
or U.S. citizens. Thus, the scope of regulatory regimes around
offshore sourcing embedded software to China are important to
examine to determine legal sources, apart from private contracts,
available to protect the United States from malicious code.

II. CHINESE AND U.S. REGULATORY LAW ARE INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVIDE PROTECTION TO U.S. CITIZENS AND COMPANIES
China allows foreign companies to invest in China and export high
technology goods, subject to some restrictions concerning State

48. Rules for Implementation of WFOEs P.R.C., supra note 33, at art. 2.
49. Regulations on the Labor Management of the Foreign-Funded Enterprise
(promulgated by Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic
Cooperation, Aug. 11, 1994, effective Aug. 11, 1994), art. 4, 8 (P.R.C.), translated at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/lawsdata/chineselaw.html/1
(last
visited Aug. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Foreign Enterprise Labor Management P.R.C.]
(stating that the labor contracts are between the employee and the foreign company
and indicating that a foreign funded enterprise must follow the Labour Law);
Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China (effective Jan. 1 1995), art. 16
(P.R.C.), translated at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/interna
tionalpolicy/200703/20070304475283.html (requiring a labor contract for any labor
relationship). In addition, a foreign-invested enterprise may employ U.S. citizens but
must give hiring preference to Chinese nationals. Regulations on the Management
of Employment of Foreigners in China (promulgated by Ministry of Labor, Jan. 22,
1996, effective May 1, 1996), ch. 2, arts. 5-6, translated at http://english.mofcom.
gov.cn/static/column/ lawsdata/chineselaw.html/1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2007)
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Regulations on Employment of Foreigners P.R.C.].
50. Contract Law P.R.C., supra note 39, at art. 126. The joint venture
arrangement would also have employment contracts with its employees. For those
employment contracts to be foreign-related, the contract must be between the U.S.
company and the Chinese employee. However, it is also possible in the joint venture
that the Chinese partner would hire the Chinese employees and have the
employment contract be between the Chinese partner and Chinese employee,
making it a domestic contract.
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51

security.
Similarly, the United States Congress only minimally
52
Thus, unless the offshore sourcing
regulates offshore sourcing.
arrangement is seen as posing a threat to national security, neither
Chinese nor U.S. regulatory law will restrict offshore sourcing.
A. Chinese Law Does Not Restrict Exporting Products Containing Embedded
Software
China promulgated the Foreign Trade Law in 2004 to support its
“opening to the outside world” by permitting more freedom to
import, export, and invest while ensuring the Chinese government
53
still maintains some oversight. Currently, this law does not restrict
54
embedded software production or export.

51. See Foreign Trade Law (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Congress, Apr. 6,
2004, effective July 1, 2004), arts. 1, 3, 11, 14, translated at http://www.tdctrade.com/r
eport/reg/reg_040503.htm?w_sid=194&w_pid=703&w_nid=&w_cid=&w_idt=1900-0101&w_oid= 180&w_jid= (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Foreign Trade Law P.R.C.].
52. John F. Delaney, Privacy, Data Security and Outsourcing: The Regulatory
Framework, in DELANEY & TANENBAUM, supra note 8, at 611-34. Often, federal and state
regulations are targeted at protecting data that is transferred between business units
or companies, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and the Amendment to
California Civil Code Section 1798.82 (requiring businesses that suffer a breach of
data security to notify California residents). Id. at 632. While there are frequent
proposals in state and federal legislatures to limit offshore sourcing, many of these
proposals seem to target only government contractors. See, e.g., Gregory B. Hladky,
Blumenthal Pushes Firms with U.S. Workers, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Conn.), Feb. 13,
2007, available at http://www.nhregister.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=17843249&BR
D=1281&PAG=461&dept_id=517515&rfi=8 (reporting that the Connecticut Attorney
General proposed legislation giving preference to U.S. companies that do not
outsource for state contracts); Chris Seper, Offshoring Finds Foes in Ohio Legislature,
PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), Apr. 19, 2004, at E4 (reporting on a proposal from lawmakers
restricting state and local contracts to companies that do not send work overseas).
53. Foreign Trade Law P.R.C., supra note 51, at arts. 1, 3, 11, 14. The Law
defines foreign trade as “the import and export of goods, technology, and the
international trade of services.” Id. art. 2. It also allows the State Council to take
action quickly if any import or export situation abruptly or abnormally interferes
with the economic security of the state:
The authority responsible for foreign trade under the State Council and
other related authorities under the State Council shall develop a surveillance
mechanism to deal with emergencies related to import and export of goods
and technology and international trade in services, to cope with emergent
and abnormal circumstances in foreign trade, and safeguard the country’s
economic security.
Id. art. 49. Unlike Exon-Florio and section 232, any violation of the Chinese Foreign
Trade Law can result in fines or criminal prosecution. Id. arts. 60-66. The Foreign
Trade Law also implements some of China’s obligations under the WTO, granting
most favored nation and national treatment to businesses from the United States. Id.
art. 6. See generally Biddulph, supra note 46, at 163-65 (listing examples of China’s
requirements under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)). So
long as the business registers its contracts, and unless another law restricts the
imports or exports, the Foreign Trade Law allows the free import and export of
goods and services. Foreign Trade Law P.R.C., supra note 51, at arts. 14-16. A
government circular sets forth procedures to be followed.
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To facilitate this trade, the Chinese government provides a catalog
that lists products and services which it classifies as encouraged,
55
restricted, or prohibited for export. China considers products or
services not listed to be “permitted” as exports. Significantly, China
does not list most goods containing embedded software as restricted
56
or prohibited, making them at least “permitted” as an export. The
catalog lists some products, such as televisions and integrated circuits,
57
which contain embedded software, as encouraged.
Thus, China
likely does not restrict a U.S. company from programming embedded
software products in China for export back to the United States.
B. U.S. Laws Focus on National Defense
The United States has two main federal laws that could be applied
to an offshore sourcing arrangement.
First, the Exon-Florio
58
Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
59
1988 authorizes the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (“CFIUS”) to investigate acquisitions or mergers with a
foreign company and, if necessary, prohibit that acquisition due to
Foreign-funded projects shall be examined and approved, and put on record
respectively by the departments of development planning and the economic
and trade departments according to the limit of authority for examination
and approval; the contracts and articles of association of foreign-funded
enterprises shall be examined and approved, and put on record by the
departments of foreign trade and economic cooperation.
Circular on Strengthening the Admin. of the Establishment of Sensitive Materials
Prod. Enters. in China by Foreign Investors, No. 165 (promulgated by State Dev.
Planning Comm., Ministry of Foreign Trade & Econ. Cooperation, State Econ.
Comm., May 11, 2002), at 1, translated at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/
InvestmentDirection/GuidanceforSpecificIndustries/P020060620332181098108.pdf
(last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (P.R.C.).
54. Catalog of Restricted Foreign Investment Industries (promulgated by State
Dev. Planning Comm., Ministry of Foreign Trade & Econ. Cooperation, State Econ.
Comm., May 11, 2002, effective May 11, 2002), translated at http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/ bizchina/2006-04/20/content_572210.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Catalog for
Investment P.R.C.]. China does restrict some types of exports “in order to safeguard
the national security, public interest, or public ethics.” Foreign Trade Law P.R.C.,
supra note 51, at art. 16. Article 26 of the Foreign Trade Law has the same restriction
for international services. Id. art. 26.
55. Foreign Trade Law P.R.C., supra note 51, at art. 11.
56. Id. arts. 4, 11; see Catalog for Investment P.R.C., supra note 54 (listing the
encouraged, restricted, and prohibited export items). China has also issued a
Circular specifically addressing questions on software export. Circular Concerning
Relevant Questions About Software Exports (promulgated by Ministry of Foreign
Trade & Econ. Cooperation et al., Jan. 4, 2001, effective Jan. 4, 2001), translated at
http://english.hebiic.gov.cn/policy/PolicyDetail.aspx?id=210 (last visited Aug. 18,
2007) (P.R.C.). This regulation clarifies that unless the software exporting company
has a registered capital of more than one million RMB, its exports must be managed
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. Id.
57. Catalog for Investment P.R.C., supra note 54.
58. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (1994).
59. Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, § 5113, 102 Stat. 1432 (1988).
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60

the effect on national security.
Notably for offshore sourcing
arrangements, CFIUS may consider a joint venture or “similar
arrangement” with a foreign company an acquisition if the foreign
61
company could gain control over the U.S. business.
While there may be an instance where an offshore sourcing joint
venture arrangement results in the Chinese partner acquiring control
of the U.S. company, in typical arrangements, the U.S. company is
62
likely to retain control over most major decisions. Furthermore,
knowing the definition of acquisition under this law, a U.S. company
could create the joint venture such that the U.S. company would not
63
lose control over most major decisions. As such, it is unlikely that
CFIUS would use the Exon-Florio Amendment to prohibit an
offshore sourcing arrangement for embedded software, because it
would not consider it a possibility that the foreign company could
64
gain control of the joint venture.
65
Second, the U.S. Trade Expansion Act section 232 allows the
President to reduce imports if he determines that the product is
being imported “in such quantities or under such circumstances” that
66
threaten U.S. national security. The Act does not explicitly define
60. Id. Note that national security is not defined in the statute. 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 2170; Nance & Wasserman, supra note 28, at 951.
61. 31 C.F.R. 800.301 (2006); accord Alvarez, supra note 28, at 82-83; Nance &
Wasserman, supra note 28, at 965-66.
62. See Nagel & Murphy, supra note 8, at 152 (noting that management’s goal to
shed non-core business functions is one reason offshore sourcing is growing,
implying that the U.S. company will retain its core functions); see also CARMEL & TJIA,
supra note 8, at 15, 111 (observing that companies tend to keep “creative, innovative,
and research oriented” activities in the United States and noting that a “strategic
peril” in offshore sourcing is losing the company’s core competency). See generally
Mendel, supra note 8, at 257 (providing the explanation that U.S. companies use
offshore sourcing to yield cost savings and increase efficiency, yet the company is
“typically able to exert more control” by offshore sourcing to a subsidiary or close
foreign affiliate). Moreover, if for some reason the CFIUS did decide to investigate
an offshore sourcing joint venture arrangement, the U.S. company could negotiate
terms to assure the Committee the requisite level of security, as Lenovo did by
moving its headquarters to the United States. Schmertz & Meier, supra note 3, at 1.
Lenovo Group Ltd., the largest China-based PC maker, acquired IBM’s PC business
in 2005. Id. The one stipulation for approval was that Lenovo would move its
headquarters to the United States from Beijing. Id. Today, major production
operations are both in China and North Carolina. Michael Schuman, Lenovo’s Global
Gambit, TIME, Oct. 2006, at G15.
63. See Chen, supra note 27, at 10 (discussing the control of power in joint
ventures and noting that it was not uncommon for the board of directors to create
an arrangement that maintains control of the other entity).
64. See id. (“The parties to a J[oint] V[enture] will pay particular attention to
balancing each partner’s control over the J[oint] V[enture].”).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000).
66. Nance & Wasserman, supra note 28, at 929-30. In enacting the section,
Congress stated that the purpose was to safeguard the security of the Nation, “not the
output or profitability of any plant or industry except as these may be essential to
national security.” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1761, at 13-15 (1958).
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the term “national security.” Instead, it gives five factors to consider
67
when assessing the level of imports. These factors indicate that the
President should construe national security to mean “national
68
defense.” Traditionally, the President has implemented restrictions
69
only when there is a threat to national defense.
The past reluctance to use section 232 does not preclude the
government from applying it to the embedded software scenario.
70
Because weapons systems are a traditional area of national security,
71
and because weapons systems contain embedded software, the
President could deem importation of weapons systems with
72
embedded software built in China a threat to national security.
However, the same threat of malicious code is present in civilian
applications, which are not normally evaluated as a threat to national
73
security.
Thus, section 232 is inapplicable to many offshore

67. 19 U.S.C. § 1862. The President should consider the following factors:
(1) “domestic production of the article needed for projected national defense
requirements;” (2) “the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements;”
(3) “existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products, raw
materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense;” (4) “the
requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services, including
the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth;” and
(5) “the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character,
and use as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet
national security requirements.” 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). The statute adds that
the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the close relation of
the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take
into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic
welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial
unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or
investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any
domestic products by excessive imports.
19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). The statute also provides that the Secretary should consider the
relationship between economic welfare and national security. 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
68. Nance & Wasserman, supra note 28, at 935-36.
69. The investigating authority (the International Trade Administration)
specifically considers whether, during a national emergency, the domestic industry
can expand production sufficiently, whether the existing stock can be converted
from civilian to military use, and whether the imports are reliable. Nance &
Wasserman, supra note 28, at 938 n.61. The only product that has been unilaterally
restricted is petroleum imports from Libya. Id. at 945. This restriction is generally
viewed as stemming from political considerations rather than the actual stockpile or
domestic ability to produce petroleum. Id.
70. See Anthes, supra note 3 (quoting the opinion of Paul Strassmann, a professor
at George Mason University, that a denial of service problem could result in “billiondollar weapons unable to function”).
71. See, e.g., id. (discussing the possible dangers of overseas code in U.S. weapons
systems).
72. Nance & Wasserman, supra note 28, at 935 (noting the President’s power to
determine which imports are a threat to national security).
73. See, e.g., id. at 935-36 (explaining that although what is a threat to national
security is undefined, “the focus is upon national defense” applications).
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sourcing arrangements of embedded software, requiring a different
approach to the embedded software scenario.
III. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT IS A MEANS TO ENHANCE
SECURITY
Even though Chinese and U.S. regulatory laws are not likely to
reduce the risk of malicious code in the embedded software scenario,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) § 1030 offers a strong
75
remedial tool to counter the scenario. This act is broad enough to
76
apply in new areas where products use embedded software and
77
allows for criminal and civil penalties.
74. Cf. Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Commerce Department to Publish ‘Catch-All’ Export Rule for
China This Spring, 23 INT’L TRADE REPORTER 427, 433 (2006) (reporting that the
Department of Commerce proposed limiting exports from the United States to
China that “could damage national security,” for example when the exporter knows
the product could have a military end-use).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). There are also narrower laws that address sabotage
of nuclear facilities or airplanes that the United States could use to prosecute a
person in those specific situations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) (providing for fines
and imprisonment for the willful damage or disabling of aircraft); 42 U.S.C. § 2284
(2000) (providing criminal penalties for the sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel).
The CFAA can be used in conjunction with these and other specific laws. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370 (D. Conn. 2001) (charging Ivanov
with violations of the CFAA, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000), and the Access
Device Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2000)); Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc.,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (charging National Health Care
Discount with a violation of the CFAA and Virginia Computer Crimes Act).
76. See Anthes, supra note 3. Anthes references software being used in weapons
systems and “systems that bundle the hardware, an operating system, a database and
other components in addition to the application code.” Id. Many articles, cases, and
even the legislative history of the CFAA reference viruses being inserted into the
Internet by a “hacker,” or some other act of an outsider using the Internet or a
network to obtain information or to impair systems. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc., 121 F.
Supp. 2d at 1272-76 (finding that the defendant violated the CFAA by using the AOL
network to send spam e-mail); H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3695-96 (discussing the problem of “hackers” and their
proliferation due to the growth of computer networks); Debra Wong Yang & Brian
M. Hoffstadt, Countering the Cyber—Crime Threat, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 201-02
(2006) (referencing breaches in security networks regardless of industry); Spammer,
Described as Scourge of In-Box, Is Charged with Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at A1
(reporting the apprehension of a hacker who used “computers infected with
malicious code to send out millions of pieces of spam since 2003”). But see Joseph M.
Olivenbaum, Ctrl-Alt-Delete: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime Legislation, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 574, 576 (1997) (“[A] ‘computer-specific’ approach results, too often,
in criminal statutes that are unnecessary, imprecise, clumsy, over-inclusive, or
ineffective.”). What the DOD report and what this Comment attempt to bring to
light is the fact that an insider can insert malicious code into any aspect of the
broader computing system, without the need of a network. Anthes, supra note 3
(“You can put back doors and Trojans in any layer of that environment, not just in
the custom code.”). In other words, the malicious code can be inserted when the
system is being built.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c), (g) (establishing fines and imprisonment for violations
of subsections (a) and (b) and allowing for a civil action for a violation of clauses (i),
(ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection(a)(5)(B)). But cf. Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes and
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U.S. companies can use the CFAA, and its case law interpretations,
as a model to incorporate similar language into contracts with
Chinese joint venture partners and Chinese employees to provide an
78
additional level of security for the embedded software. As applied
to the embedded software scenario, a U.S. company or the U.S.
government can bring a claim in a U.S. court against a Chinese
79
programmer for violating the CFAA.
Because the CFAA can be
applied extraterritorially, a U.S. court can validly exercise subject
80
matter jurisdiction over a claim brought against the programmer.
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Encompasses Malicious Code in
Embedded Software
For the CFAA to apply substantively to the embedded software
scenario, one must first determine if programming malicious code
into embedded software violates any sections of the statute. The
CFAA prohibits knowingly or intentionally “accessing” a protected
computer, “without authorization,” or “exceeding authorized access”
of a protected computer, to achieve some additional goal, such as
81
obtaining information or causing damage to the computer.
A
Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 909, 911, 922, 937-39 (2003) (criticizing the overly punitive nature of the CFAA).
78. See infra Part III.A.
79. See infra Part III.B.
80. See infra Part III.C.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The CFAA states, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever—
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or
exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information . . . of national defense or foreign relations . . .
with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits . . . to any person not
entitled to receive it;
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains—
...
(B) information from any department or agency of the United
States; or
(C) information from any protected computer if the conduct
involved an interstate or foreign communication;
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic
computer of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such
a computer . . . and such conduct affects that use by or for the
Government of the United States;
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of
value . . . ;
(5)
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protected computer is a computer used by or for the U.S.
government or a computer used in interstate or foreign commerce,
even if the computer is physically located outside of the United
82
States.

(A)
(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and . . . intentionally causes damage without
authorization, to a protected computer;
(ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and . . . recklessly causes damage; or
(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and . . . causes damage; and
(B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of
subparagraph (A), caused . . .
(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . .
aggregating at least $5,000 in value . . . ;
...
(iii) physical injury to any person;
(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or
(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a
government entity in furtherance of the administration of
justice, national defense, or national security;
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics . . . in any password or
similar information through which a computer may be accessed without
authorization, if—
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United
States; [or]
(7) with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of
value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer;
shall be punished . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (footnote omitted). A violation of the act could be as simple as
accessing a protected computer to gain information, so long as the access was an
interstate or foreign communication and was intentional. 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(a)(2)(C). The act also prohibits accessing a protected computer in order to cause
damage to the computer. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5). The damage caused may be
intentional, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), reckless, § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii), or negligent,
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii). See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21
(7th Cir. 2006) (holding that deleting files from a computer to which the defendant
was no longer allowed access, using a secure-erase program which had to be added to
the computer, would be violation of the CFAA); Moulton v. VC3, No. 1:00CV434TWT, 2000 WL 33310901, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2000) (holding that certain
methods of scanning a computer to determine security weaknesses do not fit the
definition of damage because the scanning did not compromise network security and
no information was made unavailable).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). A computer includes any “electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such
device.” Id. § 1030(e)(1). Congress then limited the definition by including the
clause, “but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.” Id. The legislative history
suggests that Congress struggled with the definition of computer.
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In the embedded software scenario, the embedded software is
likely in a device that meets the definition of a protected computer,
in part because the software helps the device perform the “logical,
arithmetic, or storage functions” needed to meet the definition of
83
computer. In addition, the computer is protected by being involved
in foreign commerce because the embedded software is programmed
84
into a computer in China, then exported back to the United States.
Thus, applied to the embedded software scenario, the programmer
inserts malicious code into a protected computer, as defined by the
85
CFAA. As a result, the key terms from the statute needing definition
are “access” and “authorization.”

The whole issue of defining the word ‘computer’ has plagued the
consideration of computer crime legislation since its early days. . . . Initially,
it was the Subcommittee on Crime’s opinion that the dictionary definition
was as good as one available considering the volatile state of technology in
this area. The Committee decided, however, that a specific definition was
desirable in order to avoid attacks upon the statute on the grounds of
vagueness.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 23 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3709.
Although much of the original 1984 statute has been changed, the definition of
“computer” has remained the same since the initial enactment. Compare Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. XXI, 98 Stat.
1837, 2190-92 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000)), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(1). A 1979 proposal suggested that the definition be: “an electronic
device which performs logical, arithmetic, and memory functions by the
manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses, and includes all output,
processing, storage, software, or communication facilities which are connected or
related to such a device in a system or network.” Olivenbaum, supra note 76, at 619
n.202 (citation omitted). While Congress recognized the need for “computerspecific” statutes, the pace at which technology changes risks making these statutes
inapplicable to certain situations. Id. at 576; accord President’s Working Group on
Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful
Conduct on the Internet, Mar. 2000, http://www.cybercrime.gov/unlawful.htm#TECH
(recommending that any regulation of unlawful conduct on the Internet should be
treated in a technology-neutral manner).
83. United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the
statute is general, likely allowing iPods, wireless base stations, cell phones, cell towers,
and other items to be considered computers, and that it is the legislature’s duty, not
the courts’, to amend the statute to give it less coverage); Lee, Embedded Software,
supra note 1, at 1 (explaining embedded software to have as its principal role the
interaction with the physical world via the device in which it resides, such as a car,
airplane, or telephone).
84. Accord Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d
Cir. 1979) (stating that the Supreme Court classified foreign commerce as applying
to “importing, exporting, and other commercial transactions as well as
transportation and communication between the United States and a foreign
country”); see United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D. Conn. 2001)
(distinguishing foreign commerce and interstate commerce).
85. Note that the end product might not be a “computer,” as commonly thought,
but even devices such as CD players contain sufficient software to be considered
“micro-computers.” See Graaf, supra note 1, at 61 (explaining that many devices
today contain software).
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The statute does not define the term “access,” but accessing a
computer is a requirement for liability in all but two of the seven
86
Due to advances in computer
subsections in section 1030(a).
technology since Congress wrote the statute, courts interpret the
87
word “access” along a continuum of broad to narrow.
One broad interpretation of “access” is “the freedom or ability to
88
make use of.” The court in America Online, Inc. v. National Health
89
Care Discount, Inc., acknowledged that the statute did not define
90
“access” and consequently turned to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary. According to the dictionary, “access” means “to exercise
91
the freedom or ability to . . . make use of something.” The court
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). Subsections (1) and (4) prohibit knowingly accessing a
protected computer. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(4). Subsections (2), (3), and (5) prohibit
intentionally accessing a protected computer. § 1030(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5).
87. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:
Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003). Professor
Orin Kerr has explored the limitations of not having a definition of access in the
statute. Id. at 1620-21. In his article, he comments that “access” can have two
different meanings—“first, that a user accesses a computer when she sends a
command to that computer instructing it to perform a task, and the computer
performs the request as instructed” or alternatively, “that a user accesses a computer
when she sends a command requesting information and the computer responds by
sending back the requested information.” Id. Thus, without a definition in the
statute it is unclear which of these meanings should be applied by courts because the
advance of computer technology since the 1970s makes the definition of access no
longer self-explanatory. Id. at 1620-21, 1641. Proponents of “unauthorized access”
laws see these laws as analogous to the traditional breaking and entering or trespass
laws, making the concept of “access” easy to envision. Id. at 640-41. Today, however,
the question becomes: what is a physical presence when there are “always on”
Internet connections? Id. at 641. While in 1975 a user had to dial-in to a computer
network using a telephone line and usually enter some text-based identification to
proceed, today’s users “merge seamlessly” with the Internet and the computers
connected to it. Id. “[T]oday you might know when you use a computer, but the
word ‘access’ is merely a label to be assigned somewhat awkwardly to conduct that
may not seem like an access at all.” Id.; accord Olivenbaum, supra note 76, at 576 (“To
the extent that they are drafted in ‘technology-specific’ language, the pace of
technological change and the ingenuity of computer-literate criminals guarantee
that those statutes will be obsolete almost as soon as they are enacted.”).
88. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1272-73 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6
(10th ed. 1994)).
89. 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255. In this civil case, America Online, Inc. (“AOL”)
brought suit against National Health Care Discount, Inc. (“NHCD”) for sending
unsolicited bulk email, or “spam,” through the AOL network to members’ email. Id.
at 1259. The contractor for NHCD harvested the AOL members’ email addresses,
then sent out hundreds of millions of emails regarding the NHCD products, often
using inaccurate “From” information. Id. at 1266-67.
90. Id. at 1272.
91. Id. at 1273 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of America
Online, Inc., “when someone sends an e-mail message from his or her own computer,
and the message then is transmitted through a number of other computers until it
reaches its destination, the sender is making use of all of those computers, and is
therefore ‘accessing’ them.” Id. at 1273. As such, NHCD made use of the AOL
member computers in violation of the CFAA. Id. at 1273; see Role Models Am., Inc. v.
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held that the sender of an email makes use of the computers through
92
which the message travels and, therefore, accesses those computers.
A similar statute in Kansas defined “access” as “to approach . . . or
93
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer.” But, in State v.
94
Allen, the Kansas Supreme Court chose to narrow the definition of
the state statute using the Webster’s Dictionary definition—“freedom
95
or ability to make use of.”
In Allen, the court found that the
defendant did not make use of Southwestern Bell’s telephone system
simply by viewing the log-in prompt, and thus did not “access” the
96
system. Since the defendant did not go beyond the log-in prompt or
enter a password, he did not have the ability to use the company’s
97
computers, and thus did not access them.
In the embedded software scenario, the programmer physically
accesses the software embedded in the computer to modify it or
98
insert malicious code.
The programmer goes beyond merely
approaching and viewing a log-in prompt, as in Allen. Instead, the
programmer alters or adds code to the protected computer.
Although in other cases, like Allen, it may be unclear whether a
defendant has accessed the computer, in the embedded software
scenario the programmer actively “exercise[s] the freedom or ability
99
to make use of” the computer to program his or her malicious code.
Under either definition of access, the programmer in the embedded
Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566-67 (D. Md. 2004) (citing Am. Online, Inc., 121 F.
Supp. 2d at 1272-73) (observing that “the word ‘access,’ in this context, is an active
verb: it means ‘to gain access to,’ or ‘to exercise the freedom or ability to make use
of something;’” therefore, passively receiving information is not accessing the
computer from which the information came); State v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365, 1367-68,
1373 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (holding that Riley accessed the telephone company’s
computers without authorization by repeatedly dialing the access number for long
distance calls and guessing random passwords in an attempt to learn which
passwords would allow him to make long distance calls and charge the calls to
another telephone company customer).
92. Am. Online, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1272-73.
93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(a)(1) (1996) (amended in 1997 to strike the word
“approach” from the definition of “Access”). Since the Kansas statute is similarly
worded to the federal CFAA, it is relevant to use as an analogy.
94. 917 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1996).
95. Id. at 852-53 (explaining that the wording “to approach” in the statutory
definition lent itself to too broad an application).
96. Id. at 853; see Kerr, supra note 87, at 1624, 1646-47 (describing Allen and
commenting that courts should interpret “access” even more broadly than the Allen
court did, while narrowing the interpretation of “unauthorized”).
97. Allen, 917 P.2d at 853. Otherwise, under the definition in the state statute,
“any unauthorized physical proximity to a computer could constitute a crime.” Id. at
852 (citation omitted).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2000).
99. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1272-73 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (defining “access” as an active verb “to exercise the
freedom or ability to make use of something”).
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software scenario accesses the protected computer to insert the
malicious code.
To violate the CFAA, the Chinese programmer must also either
“exceed authorization” to access the protected computer or access
the protected computer “without authorization.” The first case
100
interpreting access without authorization was United States v. Morris,
101
which established the “intended function” test. Morris, a student at
Cornell with authorized access to the Cornell computer system,
102
The court held that
released a computer virus into the Internet.
individuals with some access to a protected computer can still be
103
without authorization.
Specifically in that case, although Morris
had access to a function of the Cornell computer system, he did not
use the features of the computer “in any way related to their intended
104
function,” which made the use unauthorized.
Similarly, in the
embedded software scenario, the programmer has authorized access
to the original code, but by adding code in such a way that the
original code does not perform its intended function, the

100. 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 510. Although the case was decided under the 1988 version of the
CFAA, it is still relevant. The key terms in the 1988 version are carried over to the
current statute. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (2000) (“intentionally
accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such
conduct, causes damage”), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5) (1986) (“intentionally
accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, and . . . damages, or
destroys information in any such Federal interest computer”).
102. 928 F.2d at 505, 509. “Morris was authorized to use computers at
Cornell . . . . As a result, Morris was authorized to communicate with other
computers on the network to send electronic mail . . . .” Id. at 509. Morris argued
that the release of the virus via the Cornell computer only “exceed[ed] authorized
access”
and
thus
did
not
violate
§ 1030(a)(5)(A). Id. at 510. Morris relied on a Senate report that stated the statute
was aimed at outsiders who would not have access to Federal interest computers. Id.
Interestingly, Morris claimed to have released the virus only to expose weaknesses in
the Internet. Id. at 505.
103. See id. at 510 (countering that the Senate report also included as an outsider
any person who is outside of his or her government department, even though he or
she may be a government employee).
104. Id. at 510. As Professor Kerr notes, the court may have been drawing on a
seemingly unspoken rule in the computer world. Kerr, supra note 87, at 1632
(“Although the court did not elaborate on its standard, the intended function test
appears to derive largely from a sense of social norms in the community of computer
users.”). A software program is designed and built to perform certain tasks, “and
network providers enable the programs to allow users to perform those tasks.” Id. at
1632. However, by providing the program, the provider “implicitly authorizes users
to use their computers to perform the intended functions, but implicitly do not
authorize users to exploit weaknesses in the programs that allow them to perform
unintended functions.” Id. “When a user exploits weaknesses in a program and uses
a function in an unintended way to access a computer, the thinking goes, that access
is ‘without authorization.’” Id.
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programmer accesses the software, and thus the computer, without
105
authorization.
Notably, the Senate detailed its intention to distinguish between
106
“insiders” and “outsiders” in a 1986 Report regarding the CFAA.
The Report stated that Congress did not intend the statute to punish
“insiders” who legitimately had access to a government computer but
107
who had exceeded this access in the course of their employment.
The Report attempted to make clear that Congress authorized these
108
“insiders.” Arguably then, for the embedded software scenario, the
programmer merely “exceeds authorized access” because the
programmer is an “insider” in the company; the programmer has
authorized access to the protected computer to develop the
109
embedded software as part of his or her job.
This means that the
programmer did not violate CFAA sections (a)(3) nor (a)(5), which
require the access of the protected computer to be “without
110
authorization.”
The programmer, however, could violate CFAA sections (a)(2)(C)
or (a)(4), which prohibit exceeding authorization to obtain
information from any protected computer involved in interstate or
111
foreign commerce or using such computer to further a fraud. For
112
example, the court in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. found
105. Contra Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1273 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (discussing the definition of “without authorization” and
wondering if, by violating the Terms of Service, the user’s access then becomes
unauthorized for purposes of the statute). AOL members have authorization to
access the AOL network by virtue of being members, but the AOL Terms of Service
specifically state that members are not permitted to send spam e-mail. Id. at 1260.
The court held that, ultimately, authorization is a question of fact, but used the
“insider” versus “outsider” metaphor Congress used when forming the statute. Id. at
1273. (“Similarly, is the member converted from an ‘insider’ to an ‘outsider’ for
purposes of the CFAA by violating AOL’s policies? On the other hand, if AOL
members are ‘outsiders,’ then why would AOL’s membership policies apply to them
at all?”).
106. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 7-8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 248586.
107. Id. The Senate thought this “exceeding [of] authorization” could be handled
via administrative disciplinary procedures. Id. Additionally, the Senate was
concerned that people authorized to repair the computers, which includes altering
data, would be charged or sued under the Act. Id. at 12.
108. Id.
109. This flows logically from the embedded software scenario. As explained, the
programmer’s job is to access the software to program it. The programmer,
however, exceeds this authorized access as soon as he or she attempts to maliciously
add or change the software.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3), (a)(5) (2000).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c), (a)(4).
112. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). This case involved the defendant, Explorica,
using a “scraper program” to gather information from EF’s website on pricing
packages of tours for high school students. Id. at 579. A scraper program is like a
robot that gathers information quickly from the Internet. Id. The defendants
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that a former employee exceeded authorized access of EF’s website
because the access went beyond the terms of a confidentiality
113
A programmer in
contract by obtaining proprietary information.
the embedded software scenario could program malicious code to
record a user’s personal information then use that information to
gain access to personal accounts, thereby obtaining information in
violation of (a)(2)(C) and furthering a fraud in violation of (a)(4).
This reasoning is useful, as it relates to the embedded software
scenario, particularly if the U.S. company incorporates scope of
access provisions into the contract with the Chinese provider and
employees. The U.S. plaintiff can argue that access to the software
beyond what the parties stipulated in the contract “exceeds
authorization,” and thus violates the CFAA, so long as the Chinese
114
programmer obtains some information or furthers a fraud.
While the “insider” versus “outsider” distinction could present a
challenge to charging the Chinese programmer under the sections
that require access without authorization, a properly constructed
contract can help the government charge a person under the sections
115
that allow for “exceeding authorization.” On the other hand, using
the Morris “intended function” test, the programmer goes beyond
merely “exceeding authorized access” and into “without
authorization” because programming malicious code into the
computer is not using the computer “in any way related to [its]
116
Thus, it is “without authorization” under all
intended function.”
sections of the CFAA regardless of whether the programmer is
117
considered an “insider” or “outsider.”
created this scraper program specifically to gather tour information from EF’s
website in order to undercut their prices. Id. Explorica’s vice president, as a former
employee of EF, knew what type of information Explorica would need to create the
scraper program. Id. When the vice president left EF, he signed a confidentiality
contract stating that he would not use any business information contrary to the
interests of EF. Id. at 582.
113. Id. at 583-84. Note that although § 1030(a)(4) requires an intent to defraud,
the court did not rule on this intent because it was not raised in the briefs. Id. at 581
n.9. Thus, the court solely ruled on whether using the scraper program went beyond
the terms of the confidentiality agreement and in turn exceeded authorization. Id.
at 581-84.
114. See, e.g., id. (discussing the way that a contract can determine what actions
“exceed authorization”).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4). Importantly, the subsection under
which a U.S. company may bring a private right of action requires that the access be
“without authorization,” not merely exceeding authorization.
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5).
116. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1991).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The United States could take a lesson from China in this
matter. The Chinese Criminal Code’s broad statement that the government may
punish any interference in the normal functioning of a computer information system
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B. The U.S. Company Should Choose U.S. Law or Incorporate the CFAA
Language into Private Contracts
For the U.S. company in the embedded software scenario to ensure
it can benefit from the private right of action in the CFAA, the
company must explicitly choose U.S. law as the governing law in any
118
foreign-related contract.
In addition, the company should choose
119
the United States or arbitration as the forum.
Even if the contract is governed by Chinese law, the parties can use
the CFAA as a guide to incorporate provisions to increase the security
120
of the embedded software. For example, the contract should state
that programming malicious code into the embedded software
constitutes unauthorized access. Any breach of these provisions
121
would be a breach of contract, even under Chinese Contract Law.
Because China recognizes the freedom of parties to contract and
state their own terms, it is possible that the parties may not include
such protective language or may not choose U.S. law in a foreignrelated contract. Even so, a U.S. company or the U.S. government
can still pursue a CFAA claim in a U.S. court against the Chinese
programmer, as discussed below.
C. Using the Extraterritoriality of the CFAA to Enforce Security in Offshore
Sourcing Situations
If a U.S. company or the U.S. government brings a claim against
the Chinese programmer who is part of the embedded software
scenario, a U.S. court can find subject matter jurisdiction over the
CFAA claim, regardless of whether the U.S. company was able to

covers more instances of embedded software by focusing on the result, rather than
the definition of “computer” or “access without authorization.” WEI LUO, THE 1997
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND
INTRODUCTION 156 (Hein & Co. 1998) [hereinafter WEI LUO, 1997 CRIMINAL CODE]
(stating art. 286). According to the Chinese Criminal Code, if the normal
functioning of what, at the time, is considered a computer is impaired, then the
person has violated the law. Id.
118. See supra Part I.B (discussing choice of law and choice of forum in offshore
sourcing arrangements). The foreign-related contracts in the embedded software
scenario are primarily the employment contracts between the U.S. company and
Chinese programmers. The contract that produces the joint venture must be
governed by Chinese law. See id.; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text
(explaining that all employers must have employment contracts with their
employees).
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. See, e.g., Morris, 928 F.2d at 510 (explaining how contracts can provide broad
protection, even when the actions taken do not fit within the requirements of the
statute).
121. Contract Law P.R.C., supra note 39, at art. 8.
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choose U.S. law through a foreign-related contract.
In this
situation, to have subject matter jurisdiction, the court must be able
to apply the CFAA extraterritorially because the Chinese programmer
123
is located in China and much of the conduct began in China.
Before a court can apply the CFAA to prosecute the Chinese
programmer, the U.S. plaintiff must overcome the presumption
124
against extraterritoriality. Stated in 1909 in American Banana Co. v.
125
United Fruit Co., the presumption against extraterritoriality requires
the court to presume that a statute only applies within the United
126
States. Even language such as “every person” and “every contract”
will be read as meaning only everyone within the territory for which
Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate, which is usually
127
the United States.
There are, however, three ways to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality and find subject matter jurisdiction. First,
the language and legislative history of the statute can be evidence of
128
Congress’s intent for the statute to be applied extraterritorially.
Second, even if the statute is silent or ambiguous on its intent, if
122. The U.S. company can claim that the Chinese programmer violated the
CFAA. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(B). 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) states, in part, “A civil action
for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves one of the
factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5)(B).” The
U.S. government may also file a criminal case against the Chinese programmer for
violating any section of the CFAA. § 1030(c).
123. There are many ways a court could have jurisdiction over the Chinese
programmer. For the embedded software scenario in this Comment, personal
jurisdiction is not likely a viable method for the court because the scenario assumes
the Chinese programmer is not physically in the United States and likely has no
minimum contacts with the United States. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (“[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that
define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”). As the Supreme Court held in the landmark jurisdiction case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). If either of these is true, then the court may have personal
jurisdiction. A court may also have diversity jurisdiction because the programmer is
Chinese and the business or government is American, but the amount in controversy
must be more than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). This Comment focuses on
extending the CFAA extraterritorially, and finding federal question subject matter
jurisdiction for a claim brought against a programmer in China under this statute.
124. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (discussing the
presumption against extraterritoriality).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 357 (“All legislation is prima facie territorial.”).
127. Id.
128. See infra Part III.C.1 (analyzing the application of statutory interpretation to
the CFAA and the embedded software scenario).
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there is a substantial and intentional harmful effect within the
129
territory of the United States, then the court can find jurisdiction.
Finally, if there was significant conduct within the territory of the
United States that was essential to the crime or fraud, then the court
130
can find jurisdiction, even if the statute is silent. Unless the plaintiff
satisfies one of these conditions, the court cannot assume “an intent
131
to punish all whom [it] can catch.”
While courts have consistently applied “market statute” claims—
132
such as antitrust and securities fraud claims—extraterritorially, a
133
brief opinion, United States v. Ivanov was the first case to apply the
CFAA extraterritorially. Even though the CFAA is not a traditional
economic law statute, the district court properly extended the law
extraterritorially in Ivanov using similar reasoning to that in the
134
antitrust and securities cases. As such, U.S. courts can and should
129. See infra Part III.C.2 (analyzing the application of the effects test as developed
from antitrust case law to the CFAA).
130. See infra Part III.C.3 (analyzing the application of the conduct test as
developed from securities case law to the CFAA).
131. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
There is a difference between the jurisdiction to prescribe and the jurisdiction to
adjudicate. A court or legislature may have jurisdiction to prescribe or apply a law
extraterritorially if it satisfies one of these principles, but it may not be able to
enforce that law against a non-citizen if that person is not within the territory of the
United States. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 421 cmt. a (1987). Generally, U.S. law requires an extradition treaty with
the non-citizen’s country in order to try that person in the United States for crimes
committed abroad. 18 U.S.C. § 3181(a) (2000) (“The provisions of this chapter
relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries
shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with
such foreign government.”). As yet, the United States does not have an extradition
treaty with China, although the two countries do have a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 19, 2000, U.S.-P.R.C,
Temp. State Dept. No. 01-44. However, this Comment takes the approach that,
similar to the application of the antitrust statutes and the fraud provisions of the
securities statutes, a court could still adjudicate a CFAA claim against a Chinese
programmer, regardless of the existence of an extradition treaty. See, e.g., United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4-5, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that acts
committed abroad but having effects in the United States may be a basis for criminal
prosecution under the Sherman Act). See generally Charles J. Johnson, Jr., Application
of Federal Securities Laws to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALB. L. REV. 890, 89192 (1981) (summarizing that courts apply the antifraud provisions of the 1934
Securities Act extraterritorially, while perhaps courts are more restrained in applying
the registration rules for securities extraterritorially).
132. Accord Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 7-19 (1992)
[hereinafter Alford, Extraterritorial Antitrust Laws] (reviewing the antitrust case law
where courts have applied the Sherman Act extraterritorially); John W. Hamlin,
Comment, Exporting United States Law: Transnational Securities Fraud and Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 373, 385-96 (1988) (reviewing
the securities case law where courts have applied section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Act extraterritorially).
133. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2001).
134. Id. at 370, 373-75.
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continue to apply the CFAA extraterritorially in embedded software
scenario cases.
1.

The CFAA statutory language and legislative history show intent for its
extraterritorial application
One method of overcoming the presumption against
extraterritoriality for the CFAA is to interpret its language and
135
The statutory language does not have to be explicit in
history.
stating that a court can apply the statute extraterritorially; the
language may simply reference that the statute includes foreign
136
commerce.
In addition, if the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the statute to reach beyond the territorial bounds
of the United States to protect U.S. citizens, then a court can find
137
jurisdiction.
A court will first examine the plain language of the statute for clues
from Congress as to whether it intended the statute to apply
138
extraterritorially. The court in Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg began
with this plain language interpretation for section 10(b) of the 1934
139
The court
Securities and Exchange Act (“1934 Securities Act”).
135. See id. at 373 (“[T]his ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ may be
overcome by showing ‘clear evidence of congressional intent to apply a statute
beyond our borders.’” (citation omitted)).
136. E.g., Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that because Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
defines “interstate commerce” in part as trade between any foreign country and any
State, that Congress would have wanted the Section to be applied extraterritorially).
137. See id. at 663-64 (positing that if the legislative history of the 1934 Securities
and Exchange Act had given the court any direction, the court would have used that
history to help determine extraterritoriality); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d
Cir. 1977) (holding that Congress’s purpose, for both the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts, was to ensure high standards for investments in the United States, even for
investors from abroad).
138. 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998).
139. Id. at 664. But cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44
(2d Cir. 1945) (assuming that the Sherman Act does not cover agreements unless an
effect within the United States could actually be shown, without discussing the exact
language of the Sherman Act). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act states that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . . [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). The SEC then promulgated Rule 10b-5, which states that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
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noted that section 10(b) prohibits fraud via “interstate commerce or
of the mails in connection with the purchase or sale of any
140
security.” The 1934 Securities Act defines “interstate commerce” to
include “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . .
141
between any foreign country and any State.” While the statute does
not explicitly state that courts can apply it extraterritorially, the court
held that because the definition of interstate commerce included
trade with foreign countries, it showed Congress’s intention for the
142
Act to be applied as such.
The 1934 Securities Act applied extraterritorially in part because it
included the key words “commerce . . . between any foreign country
143
and any State.” The court in Ivanov used similar language from the
144
CFAA to extend the CFAA extraterritorially.
The district court in
Ivanov specifically held that, for the CFAA, the government overcame
the presumption against extraterritoriality because the CFAA uses the
key terms “interstate or foreign commerce or communication,” to
145
apply to computers.
By using both the words “interstate” and
“foreign”, Congress intended the CFAA to apply both within the
146
United States and abroad.
Consequently, the court found the
language of the CFAA sufficient to overcome the presumption
147
against extraterritoriality.
Despite the fact that the court in Kauther did not find explicit
legislative history to support its interpretation that it could apply the
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
140. Kauther, 149 F.3d at 664 (7th Cir. 1998); see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (“It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails . . . [t]o use or employ . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device . . . .”).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (2000); Kauther, 149 F.3d at 664.
142. Kauther, 149 F.3d at 664 (“Congress did leave some indication in the
language of the securities laws about their intended application to foreign
commerce.”).
143. Id.; see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d
Cir. 1979) (defining foreign commerce as “importing, exporting, and other
commercial transactions, as well as transportation and communication between the
United States and a foreign country”).
144. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D. Conn. 2001).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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1934 Securities Act extraterritorially, the Ivanov court found support
148
Congress added
in the 1996 Senate Report regarding the CFAA.
language to protect computers used in foreign commerce to the
149
CFAA in 1996.
In its Report, Congress stated its concern that
before 1996 the CFAA did not protect computers used in foreign
150
commerce even though “hackers are often foreign-based.”
In the embedded software scenario, a court should find subject
matter jurisdiction over a CFAA claim against the Chinese
programmer using reasoning identical to that in Ivanov, supported by
151
Kauther.
Congress must have intended the statute to apply
extraterritorially because the CFAA contains language that references
152
Furthermore,
both interstate and international commerce.
Congress added the 1996 CFAA amendments to address the scenario
where a person not located in the United States exceeds
authorization or accesses without authorization a computer used in
153
foreign commerce yet located in the United States. Likewise, in the
embedded software scenario, the Chinese programmer is not located
in the United States and at least exceeds authorized access of a
protected computer located within the United States. As a result, a
court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction for a CFAA claim
brought against the Chinese programmer.
2.

The effects test allows a court to extend the CFAA extraterritorially
Even if the statutory language and history is silent or ambiguous, a
court can use the effects test to determine extraterritorial application
154
of the CFAA.
The effects test, also called the objective territorial
148. Id.
149. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 3 (1996).
150. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 374; S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 4.
151. See Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that courts have concluded the statutory language indicates that that the antifraud
provisions are applicable to at least some securities transactions); Ivanov, 175 F.
Supp. 2d at 374-75 (arguing that Congress’s intent is clear in that it wanted the CFAA
to apply to “computers used ‘in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication’”).
152. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2000).
153. See Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (citing the 1996 Senate Report to suggest
that Congress was concerned about the threat of foreign-based hackers); S. REP. NO.
104-357, at 3-5 (1996). The person would also have to meet one of the additional
requirements in any of the seven sections of § 1030(a) in order to be charged. See
supra note 81 (listing the specific requirements of the CFAA).
154. A court can use this test in conjunction with the statute’s language and
history or as an individual test. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979) (conceding that other courts have found the
Sherman Act language not to prohibit extraterritorial application, and primarily
using the effects test to find jurisdiction); Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 370-74 (using
both the effects test and statutory interpretation to apply the CFAA
extraterritorially).
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principle, asserts the U.S. interest in punishing acts that have a
detrimental effect within the United States but occur outside its
155
boundaries.
Under the effects test, a country may hold a person liable under its
laws “for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
156
borders which the [country] reprehends . . . .”
The conduct in
other countries must have caused “foreseeable and substantial harm”
157
to interests in the United States for a U.S. court to find jurisdiction.
158
In addition, the effects on the United States must be actual effects.
An unparticularized harmful effect in the United States is not enough
159
to justify extending a statute extraterritorially. Furthermore, if the
defendant did not intend to cause harm within the United States,
160
then a court cannot find subject matter jurisdiction.
One of the first cases to use the effects test was a market access
161
162
case—United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”) —in 1945.
In Alcoa, an antitrust case, the court held that, despite the
presumption against extraterritoriality, it was also settled law that the
United States may hold liable any person for acts done in another
163
country but which have effects within the United States.
Alcoa, a
Pennsylvania aluminum company with many subsidiaries, had
allegedly agreed with foreign aluminum manufacturers to limit its
imports into the foreign countries, while the foreign companies
agreed either not to import into the United States or to do so under

155. Alford, Extraterritorial Antitrust Laws, supra note 132, at 4 (defining the effects
test as the ability of a state to assert jurisdiction “over conduct outside its borders
where such conduct has the intended effect of causing a substantial adverse impact
within the state’s territory” and noting that it is the exercise of jurisdiction under this
test that has produced the most conflict among nations); Hamlin, supra note 132, at
379 (using the term “objective principle” to refer to the effects test). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c),
§ 402 cmt. d (1987) (summarizing a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe law when
“conduct outside its territory has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory” as an aspect of the territoriality principle, but qualifying that it should be
only when reasonable under § 403).
156. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945). See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 346-47
(2002) (tracing briefly the history of the effects test through the antitrust case law).
157. Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998);
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1296 n.6.
158. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
159. Int’l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1980); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975).
160. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989.
161. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
162. Id. at 421 (referring to the Aluminum Company of America as “Alcoa, that
being the name by which the company has become almost universally known”).
163. Id. at 443.
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fixed amounts. The court stated that although the cartel made the
agreement outside the United States, it equaled an agreement to fix
165
The effects test was satisfied
prices, violating the Sherman Act.
because the agreement intended to restrict aluminum imports and
exports, and the agreement actually restricted aluminum imports and
166
exports.
U.S. courts continued to apply the effects test after Alcoa, notably in
167
antitrust cases, including in 1979 in Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
168
There, the court similarly held that the Sherman
Congoleum Corp.
Act prohibited acts having a harmful effect within the United States,
169
even if the parties completed those acts outside the United States.
Because the defendant’s actions in threatening patent infringement
suits in foreign countries restrained trade in the United States, the
court ruled that the United States had subject matter jurisdiction per
170
the effects test.
Similarly, the court in Ivanov properly determined that the effect of
Ivanov’s conduct in the United States gave U.S. courts jurisdiction,
171
even though Ivanov was physically in Russia. Although Ivanov used
a complex computer process that he controlled from Russia, Ivanov
purposefully accessed the OIB company’s computer without
authorization and obtained the valuable data in the United States,
172
which the CFAA prohibits. Moreover, similar to Mannington, Ivanov
164. Id. at 422.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
166. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444-45; see United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d
1, 1-2, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction over a group of Japanese fax paper
suppliers who held meetings solely in Japan to fix prices of paper in North America).
167. E.g., Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962) (holding that the Canadian respondent was not outside the reach of the
Sherman Act just because part of the activity took place outside the United States, so
long as the activity’s effects are felt within the United States); Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952) (holding that Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909), did not confer a blanket immunity on activities which “radiate
unlawful consequences” in the United States even if those activities were initiated
outside the country); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597, 610-12 (9th Cir. 1976).
168. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
169. Id. at 1291-92.
170. Id. at 1290.
171. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370-71 (D. Conn. 2001).
172. Id. at 371-72. More, specifically, an individual violates the CFAA if he or she
knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object
of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer
and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000). OIB’s computers were “protected” under the CFAA
definition because OIB used them in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)
(defining protected computers).
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threatened to damage OIB’s computers, which the CFAA also
173
OIB received this threat in Connecticut about their
prohibits.
174
computers located in Connecticut. Just as in Mannington where the
defendant made threats in a foreign country but the threats had their
175
effect in the United States, Ivanov made the threat from a computer
in Russia, but the actual effect manifested itself in the United States.
Because Ivanov accessed a specific computer in the United States and
threatened a particular company’s computer system, the effects were
sufficiently particularized and foreseeable to give the United States
176
jurisdiction under the effects test.
In addition, Ivanov intended such effects. Ivanov intended to
177
He could
obtain the data and move it to his computer in Russia.
not do this without affecting OIB’s computers in the United States.
As a result, the Ivanov court properly applied the CFAA
extraterritorially, not only because of the language and history of the
statute, but also because Ivanov’s actions had their intended and
actual effect in the United States.
In the embedded software scenario, a court can similarly find that
it has subject matter jurisdiction over a charge brought against the
178
Chinese programmer under the CFAA.
In this scenario, a
programmer in China introduces malicious code into embedded
software that the U.S. company exports back to the United States.
Similar to Ivanov, even though the programmer inserts the malicious
code into the embedded software product in China, if the product is
physically in the United States when the malicious code executes, it
179
renders its damaging effects in the United States.
Although the
Chinese programmer may only generally know that the embedded
software would be exported to the United States, but not exactly
where in the United States, this does not defeat subject matter
180
jurisdiction.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7) (“Whoever . . . with intent to extort from any person
any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer . . .
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.”); Ivanov, 175 F.
Supp. 2d at 372.
174. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
175. 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979).
176. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
177. Id. at 370-72.
178. See id. at 370-71.
179. So long as the product containing the embedded software is considered a
protected computer, the U.S. company or U.S. government can bring a claim under
the CFAA against the programmer. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (defining a protected
computer).
180. Id.
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The specificity required from the antitrust jurisprudence is
181
specificity of harm, not of location. For example, the court in Alcoa
discussed the restriction on imports as restrictions on imports into
the United States generally that affected the prices in the United
182
States as a whole.
Similarly, the court in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
183
Bank of America N.T. & S.A. addressed the effect on “external trade
and commerce of the United States” in discussing the attempt to
184
prevent the export of lumber into the United States. Neither case
discussed an effect on a particular U.S. location but, rather, looked to
185
the specific harm on the U.S. market overall.
Likewise, by
introducing malicious code into embedded software exported to the
United States, the Chinese programmer affects specifically the party
in the United States who uses that embedded software, even though
the location in the United States is not specifically known to the
programmer.
Furthermore, embedded software is usually tailored to a specific
186
product.
Thus, the programmer must understand the particular
187
If the
product to know how to introduce the malicious code.
programmer does not know specifically how to make the malicious
code work in relation to the embedded software product, the
malicious code may not execute. As such, in the embedded software
scenario there is a greater specificity of harm than in the antitrust
188
cases. The agreements in the antitrust cases discussed target prices
or higher market power but not necessarily a particular price or
189
percentage of market power.
In contrast, a particular piece of
181. Accord Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92
(3d Cir. 1979) (holding that threatening to bring patent infringement suits in
foreign countries restricted trade in the United States); see United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding that the
cartel’s general agreement to restrict production had the specific effect of limiting
imports into the United States);.
182. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
183. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
184. Id. at 611.
185. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 609-11
(9th Cir. 1976); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
186. See, e.g., Lee, Embedded Software, supra note 1, at 2 (asserting that embedded
software is closely related to and is constrained by the device into which the software
is programmed).
187. See Lee, What’s Ahead, supra note 1, at 19 (explaining that the embedded
software developer is also an expert in the particular device for which he or she is
programming).
188. E.g., Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 609-11 (finding harm to the lumber
market generally); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422 (describing a general harm to aluminum
competition in the United States).
189. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290, 1292
(3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the U.S. courts had jurisdiction because the threats to
bring patent infringement suits could be seen as an attempt to monopolize the
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malicious code, which the programmer inserts into the product,
causes the specific harm in the embedded software scenario.
However, for the effects test to apply, the plaintiff must prove that
the Chinese programmer intended to cause harm in the United
190
States. The plaintiff could prove this intention by showing that the
programmer likely knew that the product would be exported back to
the United States due to the company structure and business model,
including the influence of U.S. culture and language in daily
191
activities.
Although a joint venture or WFOE could possibly sell
embedded software products in China, in the embedded software
scenario, the company employs programmers in China but exports
the products back to the United States as part of the business model.
market); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422, 443-44 (ruling that the agreement to restrict imports
was equivalent to price fixing, which is prohibited by the Sherman Act).
190. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975); Alcoa, 148
F.2d at 444 (holding that the cartel intended to restrict aluminum imports and
exports through its agreement).
191. See Chen, supra note 27, at 10 (explaining that foreign invested enterprises
such as WFOEs and joint ventures are required to be set up for a specific purpose);
Daniel C.K. Chow, The Limited Partnership Joint Venture Model in the People’s Republic of
China, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 10-12 (1998) (arguing that joint ventures
between U.S. and Chinese partners often encounter management-style or decision
conflicts and suggesting that, at the outset of establishing the joint venture, the U.S.
company make clear through specific agreements and governance structure that it
will have the main role in the management and operational decision-making for the
enterprise). But cf. Rules for Implementation of WFOEs P.R.C., supra note 33, at art.
15 (requiring the name of the business for the application but not specifying what
the name must include). Additionally, assuming that the U.S. company that is
offshore sourcing to China has already established operations in the United States,
some knowledge transfer will need to take place between the U.S. company and the
Chinese counterpart. CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at 130-31. This knowledge
transfer forces explicit interaction between the U.S. employees and Chinese
employees to transfer knowledge areas such as skills, processes, and work norms. Id.
at 131. Furthermore, the U.S. company will set up a governance structure between
its Chinese counterpart and itself. This includes detailing the hierarchy, setting
goals, and developing a relationship. Id. at 141. Knowledge transfer activities,
setting up the governance structure, and implementing the governance structure
heavily involve the participation of the U.S. company and employees with the
Chinese employees. Thus, the Chinese employees are likely to know they are
working for a U.S.-based company. In addition, offshore sourcing often encounters
cross-cultural issues. See S. Krishna et al., Managing Cross-Cultural Issues in Global
Software Outsourcing, COMMC’NS OF THE ACM, Apr. 2004, at 62, 64 (providing
examples of cross-cultural differences that are evident in outsourcing relationships
such as preferring written agreements over verbal, social behavior, attitude toward
authority, and language); Mendel, supra note 8, at 259 (acknowledging the presence
of language and cultural differences even when the U.S. company sets up a
subsidiary in China); see also CARMEL & TJIA, supra note 8, at 176-80 (showing that in
the power orientation index by Geert Hofsted and Edward Hall, U.S. employees are
forty points lower than Chinese, meaning that hierarchy is very important to the
Chinese and they are less likely to question managers; in addition, in the relationship
orientation index, there is a seventy-one point difference, U.S. employees view
themselves as highly individualistic, Chinese employees view themselves as highly
collectivistic).
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If the U.S. company makes clear its scope of business and takes an
active role in daily operations, it is likely that the Chinese
programmer would be aware that some of the products will be
192
exported back to the United States.
By programming malicious
code into an embedded software product the programmer knew was
likely destined for the United States, the Chinese programmer
intended for the malicious code to affect the United States.
Therefore, a court can use the effects test to exercise subject matter
193
jurisdiction over the CFAA claim against the Chinese programmer.
3.

The conduct test may also be used to find subject matter jurisdiction
A person may, in some instances, commit acts within the United
States that a U.S. law may prohibit, but the consummation and effects
194
of those acts are outside of the United States. Particularly in some
securities fraud cases, a court cannot find jurisdiction using the
effects test because the harm is to non-U.S. citizens, even though the
actions furthering the securities fraud occurred in the United
195
States.
The conduct test, also called the subjective territorial
principle, allows a court to find jurisdiction when significant conduct
occurs in the United States that furthers a fraud or crime that
Congress intended to prohibit, while taking into account the
196
sovereignty of foreign nations.
192. Cf. Chow, supra note 191, at 10-12 (suggesting that the U.S. company take an
active role in the joint venture to avoid conflicts in any decision making).
193. See supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (showing how a plaintiff could
show harm necessary to meet the effects test standard).
194. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(1972) (stating that while a court has jurisdiction over conduct occurring in another
country but has effects within the United States, it also has jurisdiction over
significant conduct within the United States that relates to the harm, even if the
harm is in another country).
195. See Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding jurisdiction over a Caribbean corporation for fraudulently inducing a
Malaysian corporation to invest in satellite technology because the Caribbean
corporation used the United States as a base of operations to further the fraud);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir.
1976) (“The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other
nations’ interests.”); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (acknowledging that the harmful effects
in the case did not manifest within the United States); supra Part III.C.2 (discussing
the effects test).
196. See, e.g., Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
421-22 (8th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e decline to immunize, for strictly jurisdictional reasons,
defendants who unleash from this country a pervasive scheme to defraud a foreign
corporation.” (citation omitted)); Hamlin, supra note 132, at 378-79 (describing the
conduct test as the subjective territorial principle). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (1987)
(summarizing that, as it has developed in the United States with respect to the
regulation of securities, the conduct test permits the United States to prescribe
conduct related to any transaction in securities carried out in the United States,
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The conduct within the United States must be significant and it
must be an essential or material link to the completion of the fraud
197
or crime to find jurisdiction. While the conduct within the United
States cannot be “merely preparatory” or simply a “failure to prevent
fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in
198
foreign countries,” the conduct does not necessarily have to satisfy
the elements of the final fraud or crime for a court to find
199
jurisdiction.
Courts will find extraterritorial jurisdiction when the defendant
200
uses the United States as a base of operations.
For example,
Section 10(b) prohibits the use of the U.S. mail system to perpetrate
201
202
fraud on investors. In IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., the court ruled that the
defendants, a company incorporated in the Bahamas, could be
charged with violating section 10(b) even though the majority of the
investors were not U.S. citizens because they used the U.S. mail
203
system to perpetrate a fraud on investors.
The court stated that it
did not believe that Congress intended the United States to be a
“base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
204
when these are peddled only to foreigners.”
More recently, the court in Kauther used almost identical reasoning
of the conduct test to find subject matter jurisdiction over section
205
10(b) claims against the defendants.
The court stated that it had
jurisdiction if the conduct in the United States is substantial and has a
direct link to the loss. As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged that the defendants used the United States as a

whether or not the security is traded on an organized securities market). A court can
also use this test in conjunction with the language and history of the statute, with the
effects test, or as an individual test. See Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 416-17 (agreeing that
jurisdiction may be established by meeting the requirements of either the subjective
or objective territorial principles, or both).
197. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.
198. Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 418, 420.
199. Kauther, 149 F.3d at 667.
200. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975). See
generally Barbara S. Thomas, Extraterritoriality in an Era of Internationalization of the
Securities Markets: The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 453, 455
(1983) (summarizing how most U.S. courts have determined that Congress did not
intend for the United States to be used as a base of operations for fraudulent activity
even if the effect of the activity is felt outside the United States).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
202. 519 F.2d at 1001.
203. Id. at 1018 (“[L]iterally hundreds of transactions and pieces of mail for
Vencap and to a lesser extent for Intervent and Intercapital were initiated, directed
and consummated from and received at 99 Park Avenue.”).
204. Id. at 1017.
205. Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
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base of operations to defraud Kauther and sent the fraudulent
206
material through the U.S. mail.
Even if the United States is not a base of operations, frequent use
of the U.S. mail system can be enough for the United States to have
207
jurisdiction.
208
In Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., the
court found subject matter jurisdiction over a 1934 Securities Act
claim because the defendant’s conduct in the United States furthered
209
its fraudulent scheme. The court found that conduct in the United
States, which consisted of letters and telephone calls necessary to
210
211
organize and complete the fraud, were not “merely preparatory.”
212
Although the court in United States v. Ivanov did not find
213
jurisdiction based on the conduct test, such a finding was possible.
First, the court could consider that the United States was a base of
operations for Ivanov. Once Ivanov was in the United States, by
accessing OIB’s computers, he transferred data from the OIB
214
computers to his computer in Russia.
This conduct was similar to
the defendants in Vencap and Kauther who used offices in the United
215
States to prepare and mail fraudulent material to investors.
Because Ivanov used the OIB computers located in the United States
216
as the base to prepare the data and transmit it to Russia, his actions
satisfy the conduct test.
In addition, Ivanov used the U.S. infrastructure as a means to
complete his crime. The Ivanov court found that when Ivanov
accessed OIB’s computers, the access occurred at OIB’s location in
217
Connecticut.
This effectively places Ivanov in the United States.
Just as the defendants needed to use the U.S. mail system in
218
Continental Grain to complete their fraud, Ivanov needed to access
the OIB computers to transfer the data and transmit the threat to
206. Id.
207. Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420-21 (8th
Cir. 1979).
208. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
209. Id. at 420.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (D. Conn. 2001).
213. See id. (finding jurisdiction based on statutory interpretation and the effects
test).
214. Id. at 371-72.
215. See Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998); IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975).
216. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 371-72.
217. Id. at 371.
218. Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th
Cir. 1979).
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219

OIB.
Without the U.S. infrastructure in Continental Grain or the
OIB computers in Ivanov, neither defendant could complete his
220
crime.
Finding subject matter jurisdiction using the conduct test for the
embedded software scenario is admittedly more difficult than finding
jurisdiction using the effects test. The embedded software scenario
assumes that the programmer is located in China and programs the
221
malicious code in China.
Therefore, unlike the defendants in
Kauther or Vencap, the United States is not a base of operations for the
222
Chinese programmer.
A court could apply the conduct test to the embedded software
scenario if it takes a broad view of “access” under the CFAA. A court
has the freedom to find that the programmer in China “accesses” a
computer in the United States through the malicious code because
“access” is not statutorily defined and courts differ in their
223
interpretations of the term.
The significant and essential conduct
in the United States that furthers the programmer’s goals is the
“access” via the malicious code in the embedded software that has
been exported from China to the United States.
Although in the embedded software scenario the access does not
224
the Chinese programmer uses the U.S.
occur in real time,
infrastructure to introduce the malicious code into the country. This
is similar to the defendants in Continental Grain who had to use the
225
U.S. infrastructure to send the fraudulent investment material.
219. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
220. See id.; Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 420.
221. See supra Introduction (setting up the embedded software scenario).
222. In addition, it is unlikely the court would hold the U.S. parent company
responsible for the acts of the employee in China. A court can normally hold a
corporation responsible for criminal acts of its employees if the employee acts under
the actual or apparent authority of the corporation and for the corporation’s benefit.
United States v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1985).
This is true even if the corporation explicitly prohibits the act. E.g., United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-05, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972) (demonstrating
that compliance efforts alone do not immunize the corporation from liability). In
contrast, the court in Butera v. IBM held specifically that it could not apply the CFAA
to the corporation if the corporation did not explicitly authorize the employee’s
action. 456 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D.D.C. 2006). Therefore, a court could not find
subject matter jurisdiction based solely on the conduct of the U.S. company in the
United States, unless the U.S. company actively participated in programming the
malicious code.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2000) (defining several other terms in the statute,
but not defining “access”); see also Kerr, supra note 87, at 1617-21 (criticizing the lack
of definition); supra Part III.A (discussing definition of “access”).
224. Contra Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 369, 371-72 (describing the real time
hacking by Ivanov).
225. Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 419 (8th
Cir. 1979).
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Without the U.S. infrastructure, the Chinese programmer could not
introduce the malicious code into the United States. Just as the court
in Continental Grain found subject matter jurisdiction because the
defendant used the U.S. infrastructure in furtherance of a fraudulent
226
scheme, a court in the embedded software scenario could find
jurisdiction with similar reasoning.
Even though a court could find jurisdiction by using the conduct
test, statutory interpretation and the effects test are the strongest
bases for extending the CFAA extraterritorially and finding subject
227
matter jurisdiction in the embedded software scenario.
However,
by its nature, extraterritorial application of a U.S. law infringes on the
sovereignty of foreign nations to police and judge their own
228
citizens.
As the jurisprudence of antitrust and securities law
demonstrates, courts attempt to balance the interest of the United
States with that of the foreign nation when deciding whether to
229
exercise jurisdiction.
D. International Comity Considerations Support Subject Matter Jurisdiction
While a court can find subject matter jurisdiction over a CFAA
claim against a Chinese programmer from the language and history
of the statute, the effects test, the conduct test, or a combination of
the three approaches, there may be policy reasons why it should not
do so in a particular case. In some situations, the interest to preserve
harmony with the foreign country can outweigh the interest of the
230
United States in pursuing jurisdiction.
In the embedded software
scenario, however, the balance of international comity weighs in favor

226. Id. at 420.
227. See supra Part III.C (analyzing statutory interpretation, effects test, and
conduct test).
228. Accord Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613
(9th Cir. 1976) (stating that in addition to analyzing whether there was a sufficiently
large effect on American foreign commerce, the court must also address whether the
“magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce are (sic) sufficiently strong,
vis-a-vis those of other nations”). Timberlane’s analysis for when anticompetitive
conduct in foreign nations can provide subject matter jurisdiction for an antitrust
suit in U.S. courts has been superseded by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)
(providing a subject matter jurisdiction test for conduct involving trade with foreign
nations). The principles of international comity that the court discusses, however,
are still relevant. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14 (balancing many factors in
deciding jurisdiction).
229. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14 (listing the elements that should be taken
into account when balancing the interests of the foreign nation); see also SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (analyzing policy considerations for
exercising jurisdiction after holding that the defendant’s conduct allowed the court
to find jurisdiction).
230. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609.
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of finding subject matter jurisdiction over a CFAA claim against a
231
Chinese programmer.
1.

The jurisdictional rule of reason approach leads to exercising subject
matter jurisdiction
One primary approach to balancing a foreign country’s sovereignty
232
The
with U.S. jurisdiction is the jurisdictional rule of reason test.
court in Timberlane explained the factors a court should weigh to
balance the other country’s interest; these include: (1) “the degree
of conflict with foreign law or policy,” (2) the nationality of the
parties and the locations of the businesses, (3) the ability of either
state to enforce compliance, (4) “the relative significance of effects
on the United States as compared with those elsewhere,” (5) the
extent of the explicit purpose to harm U.S. commerce, (6) the
foreseeability of the harmful effect or conduct, and (7) “the relative
231. See Alford, Extraterritorial Antitrust Laws, supra note 132, at 37 (“[T]he U.S.
approach essentially grants courts the right to assert jurisdiction as broadly as
international law permits, but then gives them the discretion to refuse to exercise this
right in the interest of international comity.”); see also Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Relationship of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Formulation of Foreign Economic Policy, Particularly
Export and Overseas Investment Policy, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1189, 1193-94 (1980)
(suggesting that the Department of Justice took a case-by-case approach to asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly for antitrust cases, in the 1970s). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987)
(limiting the jurisdiction to prescribe if it would be “unreasonable”). The
Restatement lists the following eight factors to consider in determining
reasonableness:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2). It
then cautions that the list is not exhaustive and that no priority should be given to
any one factor. Id. § 403 cmt. b.
232. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
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importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
233
After assessing these
States as compared with conduct abroad.”
factors and the potential conflict between the United States and the
foreign country, if the United States asserts jurisdiction, the court
should then determine whether the interests of the United States are
234
sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Using the jurisdictional rule of reason test, the court in Timberlane
235
found subject matter jurisdiction appropriate. Even though most of
the antitrust activity took place in Honduras, the defendants likely
organized the conspiracy from San Francisco, which affected
236
competition and commerce in the United States. In addition, U.S.
237
antitrust law did not conflict with the law or policy of Honduras.
The court was also not concerned about the harmony of relations
between the United States and Honduras if a U.S. court exercised
238
jurisdiction in the matter.
Whether a court should exercise subject matter jurisdiction in a
particular embedded software scenario will vary depending on the
239
exact nature of the crime.
Certain factors from the jurisdictional
rule of reason do weigh in favor of finding jurisdiction in the
embedded software scenario.
240
First, similar to Timberlane, there is no conflict with Chinese law.
Chinese law does not require a programmer to insert malicious code
into embedded software. In fact, a court can legitimately read the
Chinese Criminal Code to prohibit such conduct, making the U.S.
241
and Chinese criminal laws similar. Even if a court does not read the
233. Id.; see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98
(3d Cir. 1979) (reiterating and adding to the Timberlane factors but holding that
the factual record was not sufficient to make a finding about the factors).
234. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614-15; cf. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J.
INT’L L. 280, 317 (1982) (positing that it is difficult for a U.S. court to objectively
balance the interest of another country with that of the United States, thus making
the jurisdiction rule of reason test unworkable).
235. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421-22
(8th Cir. 1979) (holding that the United States had jurisdiction when considering
international comity); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614-15 (finding that the U.S. court had
jurisdiction after weighing all the factors to determine whether finding jurisdiction
would conflict with foreign law or policy).
240. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615 (“[T]here has been no indication of any
conflict with the law or policy of the Honduran government.”).
241. Specifically, the Chinese Criminal Code article 286 states in relevant part:
Whoever . . . cancels, alters, increases or jams the functions of the computer
information system, thereby making it impossible for the system to operate
normally . . . . Whoever intentionally creates or spreads destructive programs
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Chinese Criminal Code as such, the Code does not appear to
242
encourage such acts. Thus, a court could not find a conflict of law
243
to weigh against jurisdiction.
Second, due to the lack of ensured prosecution in China, it is more
likely the U.S. judicial system can effectively adjudicate its computer
244
crime law, both civilly and criminally.
Third, all effects from the
such as the computer viruses, thus affecting the normal operation of the
computer system . . . shall be [sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment].
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by National People’s
Congress, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 286, available at http://www.lawi
nfochina.com/law/dispecontent.asp?db=1&id=354 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Criminal
Code P.R.C.]. See generally WEI LUO, 1997 CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 117, at 8
(interpreting 1997 Criminal Code, Article 3, to state that only crimes that are defined
explicitly in the Code are crimes; a person cannot be found guilty by an analogous
law).
242. See generally Criminal Code P.R.C., supra note 241, at arts. 4, 286 (stating that
any offender of an act explicitly defined in the law shall be punished, and
prohibiting the spread of computer viruses); WEI LUO, 1997 CRIMINAL CODE, supra
note 117, at 16 (listing as one of the major new offenses added to the 1997 Criminal
Code to be “computer frauds (Article 285-286)”).
243. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615 (citing a lack of a conflict of law as a factor
supporting jurisdiction).
244. See supra note 131 (noting that the power to adjudicate and the power to
enforce are separate and therefore although a U.S. court could rule against a
Chinese national, there may still be an issue of enforcing the judgment). Despite
China’s recent progress and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO),
litigating in China still concerns U.S. companies. E.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 3 (“China deserves due
recognition for the tremendous efforts made to reform its economy to comply with
the requirements of the WTO.”); Mei Ying Gechlik, supra note 46, at 97-98
(criticizing China’s courts for lacking fairness and justice but noting that Beijing has
begun to take steps to improve the judicial system); Mo Zhang, Int’l Civil Litigation in
China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
59, 63 (2002). One of the reasons for the concern is that few Chinese laws are
published in English, and the Chinese judicial system is complex for someone
unfamiliar with it. See Sylvia Ostry, Article X and the Concept of Transparency in the
GATT/WTO, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL TRADE, supra note 46, at 128
(noting the “multilayered complexity” of the Chinese legal system and reviewing the
various types of laws, including internal administrative laws and generalized laws
issued by the National People’s Congress); see also WEI LUO, CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL
RESEARCH 164-65 (2005) (reviewing the history of the Chinese publishing industry,
which was essentially shut down during the Cultural Revolution but between the
1980s and 2000 grew from a little over forty thousand titles to over one hundred and
forty three thousand titles). Lawyers and scholars also recognize problems within the
Chinese judicial system, which has suffered from interference by the Chinese
Communist Party (“CCP”) leaders. Mei Ying Gechlik, supra note 46, at 100-01
(reporting that, as of 2005, interference into the judiciary from party officials was still
a major obstacle in litigation); Yuwen Li, Court Reform In China: Problems, Progress and
Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 58-59 (Jianfu
Chen et al. eds., 2002) (listing lack of judicial independence as a major problem of
the judicial system and reporting that courts often make decisions on cases according
to the “instructions of the leaders of the Communist Party” and the government).
The central government and CCP leadership have a large influence on the local
courts, which in turn facilitates pushing the judges to conform their judgments to
the social and legal ideals of the CCP. See Mei Ying Gechlik, supra note 46, at 136
(explaining that this influence is a fundamental problem with the court system); see
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malicious code will be in the United States, none in China. Finally,
these effects are explicit and foreseeable in causing harm to the
United States. All these factors combine to weigh in favor of
245
exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
2.

Policy considerations also permit exercising jurisdiction
A court does not have to rely on the Timberlane factors to balance
jurisdiction with international comity, but can look to other policy
246
considerations to examine this balance.
One line of reasoning
suggests that if the U.S. exercises jurisdiction for conduct within its
borders but with the ultimate effects felt abroad, it encourages other
countries to find and exercise jurisdiction when conduct occurs in
the foreign country but has its effects in the United States, thus
247
further protecting the United States.
In addition, if there is no
conflict with the other country’s laws, then a court can often find
248
jurisdiction without further consideration.
A second line of reasoning suggests that if a court can discern from
the statute or the legislative history an intent on the part of Congress
to prohibit a specific action within the United States, then the
249
balance will favor finding jurisdiction.
If Congress designed a law
to protect certain groups in the United States, then a court will tend

also Biddulph, supra note 46, at 176 (explaining that courts and judges in China have
a lower status and lack financial independence from the local government, which
hampers the judges’ independence to rule on cases). As such, a U.S. company is not
guaranteed fairness and the relative predictability it is accustomed to in the United
States if it uses Chinese courts to litigate. See, e.g., Biddulph, supra note 46, at 156
(noting that there is still unease about the relationship between law and policy set by
the ruling Chinese Communist Party).
245. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (listing factors for determining when subject
matter jurisdiction should be exercised). Factors that weigh in favor of not
exercising jurisdiction include the fact that the programmer is a Chinese citizen and
that China does have a law apparently prohibiting the spread of computer viruses. In
addition, a court should take into account the current political relationship with
China at the time the case arises. See id.
246. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (articulating three
general policy rationales for finding jurisdiction); see also Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty.
Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1979) (using policy
rationales from Kasser to support finding jurisdiction).
247. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (“By finding jurisdiction here, we may encourage
other nations to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate frauds
in the United States.”); see also Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (stating that finding
jurisdiction will encourage other nation’s courts to find jurisdiction when a fraud
takes place in the United States).
248. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-99 (1993)
(determining that there was no conflict with British law).
249. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (noting that the purpose of the statute was to
protect the domestic market from fraud and finding jurisdiction would conform with
that purpose); see also Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (agreeing with the rationale
articulated by the Kasser Court).
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250

to find jurisdiction. In SEC v. Kasser, the court held that Congress
designed the antifraud provisions of the securities acts to ensure
“high standards of conduct in securities transactions” in the United
251
States and protect “investors from the effects of fraud.” Moreover,
the court found that the legislative intent was to prevent the United
252
States from becoming a “haven” for defrauders and manipulators.
Similarly, in Continental Grain, the court held that finding jurisdiction
was consistent with the intent of Congress to encourage high
standards of conduct in the investment market and not to use the
253
United States as a base of operations.
Furthermore, in both Kasser and Continental Grain the courts also
held that by finding jurisdiction it would encourage other countries
“to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate
254
frauds in the United States.” While both policy reasons need not be
present, they offer alternative reasoning to the factor test set out in
Timberlane.
255
More recently, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the
Supreme Court found that “international comity would not counsel
against exercising jurisdiction” based on a comparison of U.S. and
256
British law. The Court focused solely on the fact that British law did
not force the London insurance providers to violate U.S. law, even
257
though the providers’ actions would have been legal in London.
The Court held that simply because conduct is lawful in the country
in which it takes place, it does not prevent extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws “even where the foreign state has a strong policy
258
to permit or encourage such conduct.” Thus, there was no conflict
of U.S. and British laws to weigh against exercising jurisdiction, which
259
was the only conflict the Court felt it needed to consider.
Applying the non-Timberlane international comity approaches to
the embedded software scenario, a court can still exercise subject
matter jurisdiction. First, Congress designed the CFAA to punish
250. 548 F.2d at 109.
251. Id. at 116.
252. Id.
253. Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 421.
254. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116; see also Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (hoping that
finding jurisdiction would lead to reciprocal enforcement abroad).
255. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
256. Id. at 798.
257. Id. at 797-99.
258. Id. at 799.
259. Id.; cf. Alford, Extraterritorial Antitrust Laws, supra note 132, at 19 (describing
the Hartford ruling and criticizing the Court for its lack of concern for “the
legitimate sovereignty interests of another country that may have concurrent
jurisdiction”).
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those who access a protected computer without authorization.
While there is still debate on the exact definition of “access” and
“authorization,” the 1996 Senate Report noted Congress’s concern
for computers used in foreign commerce that were vulnerable to
261
hackers located in foreign countries. Just as Congress intended the
securities acts to protect investors from general fraud and to
262
encourage high standards in the investment market, the CFAA
protects computer users from unwanted access and encourages those
with knowledge about computer systems to use their knowledge to
263
improve technology, not to harm others.
Second, finding jurisdiction over a Chinese citizen for violating the
CFAA may encourage China to find jurisdiction over its own citizens
who attempt to cause harmful effects in the United States.
Additionally, if exercising jurisdiction in the securities cases can
encourage
a
higher
standard
for
investment
markets
264
internationally, then finding jurisdiction in the embedded software
scenario can encourage a higher standard for ensuring software
security. Third, and more directly, using the Hartford Fire analysis, so
long as there is no conflict between U.S. law and Chinese law, there is
265
no need to further examine international comity principles.
Because a Chinese programmer could comply with both Chinese law
and U.S. law by not programming malicious code into the embedded
software, international comity would not preclude jurisdiction over a
266
CFAA claim.
In sum, a court can use the jurisdictional rule of reason factor
analysis to determine whether it should exercise subject matter
jurisdiction in the embedded software scenario or a more generalized
260. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 3-5 (1996) (stating that the goal was to have a
single statute to address all computer crimes).
261. See id. at 4-5; see also United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D.
Conn. 2001) (using the 1996 Senate Report to support its finding of extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
262. See, e.g., Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
421 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (prohibiting computer fraud and abuse).
264. Accord Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (agreeing with the Kasser analysis); see
Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (reasoning that finding jurisdiction would make it more likely
that foreign courts would also find jurisdiction, creating a more effective securities
regulation regime).
265. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (holding
that there was no conflict between British and American Law because the party could
abide by both laws simultaneously).
266. See id. at 798-99 (reasoning that there is only a conflict if a party cannot abide
by both laws simultaneously). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(2)(h) (1987) (listing the likelihood of conflict with
regulations of another state as a factor in analyzing whether a U.S. court should
exercise jurisdiction).
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policy consideration approach. Either method will take into account
the United States’ relationship with China and its own interests in
protecting American citizens and businesses yet still result in finding
267
subject matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
U.S. businesses looking to source work in China and the U.S.
government have an interest in ensuring the security of embedded
software designed and built in China. In addition to incorporating
protective language into private contracts and choosing U.S. law in
foreign related contracts, extending the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act extraterritorially allows the United States to prosecute or sue a
Chinese citizen who chooses to program malicious code into
embedded software, even though that person is physically located in
China. Following the reasoning of antitrust and securities fraud
cases, the CFAA can be applied extraterritorially because of its
statutory language and history; because the effects of the malicious
code in the United States is substantial; and because conduct
furthering the violation of the CFAA occurred in the United States.
The extraterritorial application of the CFAA also acts as a deterrent
to any programmer who would program malicious code into
embedded software developed in China, and it serves as a remedial
tool for any malicious code that has already made its way to the
United States. Therefore, even acknowledging that there may be
some security risk to developing embedded software overseas, there is
no need to restrict offshore sourcing to China.

267. Supra notes 232-34, 247-59 and accompanying text.

